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U.S. TORTURE AS A TORT
Richard Henry Seamon*
ABSTRACT
Now that the United States has used torture in the war on terrorism and the
victims of this torture have begun to sue, it is useful to analyze the potential
liability of the United States and its officials for torture under current
domestic law. This Article conducts that analysis, and, based on it, assesses
the adequacy of current law. The Article concludes that the United States
and its officials have no more than minimal liability for torture under current
law. The Article also concludes that current law is inadequate. It is
inadequate because it is based on considerations of when the government
should be liable for mere torts, and official torture is far removed from
ordinary torts. The Article argues that, instead of being treated like a tort,
torture should be treated like a civil rights and a human rights violation.
Specifically, the United States should be liable for torture under at least the
same circumstances as units of local government would be under the civil
rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and U.S. officials should be liable for
torture under at least the same circumstances as state and local officials
would be under § 1983, or as foreign officials would be under the Torture
Victim Protection Act of 1991.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 9/11, the United States has tortured people detained in the war on
terrorism.' The victims of this torture have begun to sue.2 This Article
* Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law. I thank my colleagues
Monique Lillard and Malla Pollack for thoughtful suggestions on drafts of this Article.
1. See MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND TRUTH: AMERICA, ABu GHRAIB, AND THE WAR ON
TERROR 1-49 (2004); SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND 1-72 (2004); Article 15-6
Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade [hereinafter Taguba Report], reprinted in
THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 405, 416-17 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua
L. Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter TORTURE PAPERS]; Final Report of the Independent Panel to
Review Department of Defense Detention Operations (Aug. 2004) [hereinafter Schlesinger
Report], reprinted in TORTURE PAPERS, supra, at 908, 914; Human Rights Watch, Leadership
Failure: Firsthand Accounts of Torture of Iraqi Detainees by the U.S. Army's 82nd Airborne
Division (Sept. 2005), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2005/us0905/us0905.pdf; Anthony
R. Jones & George R. Fay, Investigation of Intelligence Activities at Abu Ghraib [hereinafter
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Fay-Jones Report], reprinted in TORTURE PAPERS, supra, at 987, 989, 993-94, 1004-05, 1024-
25, 1070-95; Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") on the
Treatment by the Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War and Other Protected Persons by the
Geneva Conventions in Iraq During Arrest, Internment and Interrogation (Feb. 2004)
[hereinafter ICRC Report], reprinted in TORTURE PAPERS, supra, at 383, 390-401; see also
Colum Lynch, U.N. Draft Decries U.S. on Detainee Treatment, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2006, at
A9 (reporting that draft U.N. report says that U.S. treatment of prisoners at Guantinamo Bay
detention center "in some cases constitutes a form of torture"). Based on the many reports of
the torture of detainees, after this Article was accepted for publication, Congress enacted the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680 (Dec. 30, 2005).
Section 1003 of the Act says, "No individual in the custody or under the physical control of
the United States Government, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject
to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment." Id. § 1003(a), 119 Stat. at 2739.
The Act defines "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment" as
the cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, as
defined in the United States Reservations, Declarations and Understandings to the
United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment done at New York, December 10, 1984.
Id. § 1003(d), 119 Stat. at 2740. The "Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings" to
which the definition refers limit the definition of torture to conduct that violates the Fifth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No.
100-20, at 15-16 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 113. The Detainee Treatment Act was included in two
separate pieces of legislation: a supplemental appropriations bill enacted on December 30,
2005, and the Department of Defense Authorization bill enacted on January 6, 2006. See
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-163, §§ 1401-1406, 119 Stat. at 3136, 3471-80;
President's Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2006, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 23 (Jan. 6, 2006) (observing that provisions of the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 included in the defense authorization bill are identical to
those included in the previously enacted supplemental appropriations bill, except for a
punctuation change in one provision and revisions in a second provision), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2006-presidential-dcuments&do
cid=pdl6ja06_txt-3.pdf.
2. See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 252-56 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (alleging
that the hypothetical events described infra Part I.C actually happened to a Syrian-born,
Canadian engineer); Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Damages, Ali v. Pappas, No.
05CV00371, 2005 WL 732090 (D. Conn. Mar. 1, 2005) (suit brought by seven people
detained in Iraq or Afghanistan alleging torture and other mistreatment by the former
commander of military intelligence and military police in Iraq); Complaint for Declaratory
Relief and Damages, Ali v. Rumsfeld, No. 05C 1201, 2005 WL 922428 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 1,
2005) (same suit brought against the Secretary of Defense); Complaint for Declaratory Relief
and Damages, Ali v. Janis, No. 9:05cv654-23, 2005 WL 918561 (D.S.C. Mar. 1, 2005) (same
suit brought against the former commander of U.S. military forces in Iraq); Complaint for
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discusses when the United States and its officials can be held civilly liable
for torture under current law. The Article also discusses the adequacy of
current law for assessing liability in this setting and suggests improvements.
To put human faces on this discussion, this Article focuses on claims
arising from the following three scenarios of U.S.-sanctioned torture, all of
which are based on actual reports.
A. Scenario One (Abu Ghraib)
The U.S. military has detained a U.S. citizen of Iranian descent, Ali, at
the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. 3 U.S. officials reasonably believe that Ali has
killed members of the U.S. military force in Iraq and has information about
other Iraqi insurgents. The military police guarding Ali have instructions
from military intelligence officers on site to "loosen him up.'A Several
guards use this "loosen him up" instruction as an excuse to brutalize Ali in
ways that they know violate military regulations and the Uniform Code of
Declaratory Relief and Damages, Ali v. Sanchez, No. M-05-065, 2005 WL 918783 (S.D. Tex.
Mar. 1, 2005) (same suit brought against the former commander of the Coalition Joint Task
Force-7, the U.S.-led military coalition in Iraq); Complaint, Rasul v. Rumsfeld, No.
04CV01864, 2004 WL 2878175, (D.D.C. Oct. 27, 2004) (suit brought by citizens of the
United Kingdom alleging torture and other mistreatment during detainment by the United
States and allied forces in Afghanistan); see also Complaint, Al Rawi v. Titan Corp., No.
04CV 1143 R, 2004 WL 1380538 (S.D. Cal. June 9, 2004) (class action alleging the torture of
detainees in Iraq by private security companies under contract with the United States). The
question of how to define torture, though important, is beyond the scope of this Article
because the definition usually does not matter for purposes of assessing the liability of the
United States and its officials for the U.S.-sanctioned use of significant physical and
psychological force against an individual. See generally Torture Victim Protection Act of
1991 ("TVPA"), Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 3(b), 106 Stat. 73, 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
1350 note (2000)) (defining "torture" for the purposes of the TVPA); 2 COMPACT EDITION OF
THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 3357-58 (1971) [hereinafter OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY] (defining "torture"); Fionnuala Ni Aoldin, The European Convention on Human
Rights and Its Prohibition on Torture, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION 213, 213-27 (Sanford
Levinson ed., 2004) (discussing the definition of torture under the European Convention on
Human Rights).
3. See Josh White, 5 Americans Held by U.S. Forces in Iraq Fighting, WASH. POST,
July 7, 2005, at A15 (reporting that U.S. citizens suspected of insurgent activities in Iraq were
being held at Abu Ghraib and other Iraqi sites).
4. See Taguba Report, supra note 1, at 418 (finding credible a statement by a member
of the military police that military intelligence officers instructed Abu Ghraib guards to
"[Il]oosen this guy [i.e., a detainee] up for us").
2006]
RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL
Military Justice.5 For example, the guards have repeatedly beaten Ali with a
broom handle; sodomized him with a chemical light stick; and forced him to
masturbate another male inmate in front of a female guard, who videotaped
the incident.6
B. Scenario Two (GTMO)
U.S. officials have captured an Afghan citizen, Ghuljaan, in Afghanistan
and are detaining him at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantinamo Bay, Cuba
("GTMO"). U.S. officials reasonably believe that Ghuljaan is an al Qaeda
member involved in the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States and has
valuable information about its leaders. The officials assigned to interrogate
Ghuljaan ("GTMO interrogators") use methods that they reasonably believe
are specifically authorized by the Secretary of Defense. For example, the
GTMO interrogators put Ghuljaan in a cell where the lights are always on
and there is a constant loud, hissing sound; they question him for twenty
hours at a time; keep him naked for days at a time; and "waterboard" him by
strapping him to a board and then dunking him under water to make him
believe he is drowning.7
5. See id.
6. See id. at 484-85 (finding credible reports of actual physical abuse identical to those
described in the above text).
7. See Affidavit of David Hicks, Rasul v. Bush, CV: 02-0299 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 5,
2004), available at http://www.smh.com.au/news/World/David-Hicks-affidavitl2004/12/l0/
1102625527396.html) (providing allegations by a GTMO detainee that include beatings, sleep
deprivation, and the use of strobe lights); DANNER, supra note 1, at 34-36 (discussing
allegations of waterboarding); ICRC Report, supra note 1, at 392-93 (reporting detainees'
allegations of being exposed to loud noise or music and constant light, being forced to stand
for long periods, and being kept naked for days at a time); Memorandum from Jerald Phifer,
Dir., J2, Dep't of Def., to Gen. James T. Hill, Commander, Joint Task Force 170 (Oct. 11,
2002) (requesting approval to use various interrogation procedures at GTMO including,
among "Category I techniques," "[t]he use of stress positions (like standing), for a maximum
of four hours," "[tihe use of 20 hour interrogations," and "[riemoval of clothing"), reprinted
in TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 1, at 227, 227-28; Memorandum from William J. Haynes II,
Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Def., to Donald Rumsfeld, Sec'y of Def. (Nov. 27, 2002) [hereinafter
Nov. 27 Action Memo] (indicating the Secretary of Defense's approval of Category II
techniques), reprinted in TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 1, at 237, 237. But cf Memorandum
from Donald Rumsfeld, Sec'y of Def., to James T. Hill, Commander, U.S. S. Command (Apr.
16, 2003) [hereinafter Apr. 16 Memo] (authorizing a more limited set of interrogation
techniques, which do not expressly include prolonged standing, twenty-hour interrogations, or
the removal of clothing), reprinted in TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 1, at 360, 360-61.
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C. Scenario Three (Syrian Rendition)
Officials of the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") have detained a
Syrian-born resident of Canada, Sami, whom they reasonably suspect of
being a terrorist.8 Soon after arresting Sami in New York City, the CIA
officials send Sami to Syria for interrogation in accordance with an
"extraordinary rendition" program developed by the CIA and approved by
the White House. As the CIA officials know will happen, Syrian officials
subject Sami to months of brutal interrogation. For example, they repeatedly
whip his hands with two-inch-thick electrical cable; inject him with
disorienting drugs; and keep him in a windowless, underground cell.
Reflecting the range of real cases, the preceding scenarios differ in the
citizenship of the victim, the identity of the torturers, and the location and
other circumstances of the torture. As we will see, under current law, these
differences matter and, indeed, raise many important, unsettled issues of
governmental and official tort liability. The upshot, however, is that under
current law liability is minimal. Torture victims can sue the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"),9 but the United States
probably will escape FITCA liability in all three scenarios. Torture victims
can sue U.S. officials under the "constitutional tort" theory of Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics Agency.
10
Officials will probably escape Bivens liability, however, except for
deliberately malicious, obviously illegal conduct. Furthermore, most officials
will be effectively judgment proof. In short, the availability of civil remedies
for U.S. torture under current law is razor-thin.
8. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 252-56 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (describing
facts alleged in the case on which Scenario Three is based); Bruce Zagaris, Canada Protests
Deportation of Canadian Citizen to Syria, 20 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 10, 10-12 (2004)
(discussing the Arar case); Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14 & 21,
2005, at 106 (same); see also HERSH, supra note 1, at 53-56 (describing other cases of
extraordinary rendition); U.S. Operated Secret "Dark Prison" in Kabul, HuMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, Dec. 19, 2005, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/12/19/afghan12319.htm (reporting
on a "dark prison" in Afghanistan apparently run by the CIA at which suspected terrorists
were tortured).
9. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (2000).
10. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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Current law must change in order for the United States to keep its
promise not to torture people.1' The law must change in both its conception
of U.S. torture and in the extent to which it provides civil remedies for U.S.
torture. Current law misconceives U.S. torture as a mere tort, a private wrong
committed by one individual upon another. That misconception makes
current law almost useless in producing remedies for torture victims-not
because it was designed to deny remedies for this wrong-but because it was
not designed with this wrong in mind. The victims of U.S. torture should not
be denied civil remedies merely because existing law does not contemplate
that the United States or its officials will ever engage in torture. This Article
proposes that torture should be treated as a civil rights and a human rights
violation, rather than as a tort. Under that conception, at a minimum, the
United States should be civilly liable to torture victims under circumstances
when, under current law, a city or county would be civilly liable under the
civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; likewise, U.S. officials should be liable
for torture when state or local officials would be under § 1983 or,
alternatively, when foreign officials would be under the Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991.
This Article's descriptive and prescriptive exploration of the relevant law
proceeds in three parts. Part II briefly describes relevant aspects of sovereign
and official immunity. This description makes clear that torture claims
against the United States must be analyzed separately from torture claims
against U.S. officials. Part 1I analyzes torture claims against the United
States, and Part IV analyzes torture claims against U.S. officials. Each part
focuses, though not exclusively, on claims that would arise from the three
scenarios previously described. Parts 11 and IV also address the adequacy of
the current law and suggest improvements.'
2
11. See, e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller et al., Bush Says Iraqis Will Want G.L's to Stay to
Help, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2005, at Al ('"Torture is never acceptable .... nor do we hand
over people to countries that do torture."' (quoting President George W. Bush in an
interview)); President George W. Bush, Statement on the U.N. International Day in Support of
Victims of Torture, June 26, 2004 ("America stands against and will not tolerate torture."),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040626-19.html.
12. There is little case law or commentary examining the liability of the United States
and its officials for torture under current U.S. law. See Scott J. Borrowman, Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain and Abu-Ghraib--Civil Remedies for Victims of Extraterritorial Torts by U.S.
Military Personnel and Civilian Contractors, 2005 BYU L. REV. 371; cf Association of the
Bar of the City of New York & Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, Torture by
Proxy: International and Domestic Law Applicable to "Extraordinary Renditions," 119-20
720 [Vol. 37:715
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I. BACKGROUND ON SOVEREIGN AND OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
In general, a private person cannot sue the United States without its
consent.' 3 Private suits against the United States to which it has not
consented are barred by sovereign immunity. 14 Although many criticize the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, the U.S. Supreme Court still recognizes it.
15
Indeed, the Court has implied that the doctrine has constitutional roots,
which presumably immunizes it from judicial abrogation. 16
Sovereign immunity has limits. One might think that, as a matter of
fairness and logic, a limit would exist to allow suits against the United States
for unconstitutional conduct. Not so. 17 Indeed, the United States has often
avoided liability for its unconstitutional conduct. For example, it has
successfully claimed sovereign immunity from claims based on its
internment of Japanese-Americans during World War 118 and its
experimenting with LSD (lysergic acid diethylamide) on unknowing human
(New York: ABCNY & NYU School of Law, 2004) [hereinafter Torture by Proxy]
(discussing possible civil liability of officials involved in U.S. renditions).
13. See, e.g., Dep't of Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 260 (1999) ("Absent a
waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit."
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471,475 (1994))).
14. See generally RIcHARD H. FALLON Er AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 944-72 (5th ed. 2003).
15. See, e.g., Orff v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2606, 2609-11 (2005) (holding that a suit
against the United States was barred by sovereign immunity).
16. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 14, at 944-47.
17. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 670 n. 12 (1980) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) ("Ironically, the ... Federal Government[] cannot be held liable for constitutional
deprivations. The Federal Government has not waived its sovereign immunity against such
claims .... "); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("However desirable a direct remedy against the
Government [for unconstitutional conduct] might be as a substitute for individual official
liability, the sovereign still remains immune to suit.").
18. See Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 245-46 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that
common law tort claims were barred by sovereign immunity because plaintiffs did not satisfy
the administrative filing requirement that was a condition on the waiver of sovereign
immunity created by the FTCA), vacated by 482 U.S. 64 (1987).
2006]
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subjects.' 9 The United States has committed many other sins under the cloak
of sovereign immunity.2°
Thus, even if the torture described in our scenarios violates the victims'
constitutional rights and even if the United States is responsible for those
violations, that does not mean the victims can sue the United States for
money damages. To the contrary, their suits will be barred, unless the United
States has consented to them. Implicit in this conclusion, however, are two
limitations on the doctrine of sovereign immunity, each of which offers hope
to the torture victims in our scenarios.
First, the United States has consented to many types of suits by enacting
statutes that waive sovereign immunity.21 Part II of this Article discusses the
FTCA which is the only federal statute that might function to waive the
United States' sovereign immunity from torture claims. The victims in our
three scenarios can sue the United States for money damages if the FTCA
waives sovereign immunity from their claims.
Second, although sovereign immunity bars a suit that names the United
States as a defendant, it does not bar a suit that names a U.S. official as a
defendant and that seeks money damages out of that official's own pocket.24
19. See Stanley v. CIA, 639 F.2d 1146, 1149-53 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that sovereign
immunity barred a claim alleging U.S. officials had administered LSD to plaintiff, without his
knowledge, while he was in the military).
20. See, e.g., Lombard v. United States, 690 F.2d 215, 216-26 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (barring
constitutional claims against the United States that alleged the deliberate exposure of a service
member to radiation); Ascot Dinner Theatre, Ltd. v. Small Bus. Admin., 887 F.2d 1024, 1031
(10th Cir. 1989) (barring a First Amendment claim against a federal agency).
21. See 14 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3656,
at 424 (3d ed. 1998) ("In a series of federal statutes, enacted over many years, Congress
successively has widened the exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign immunity and broadened
the consent of the United States to be sued.").
22. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (2000).
23. See infra Part III.A-D. 1.
24. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 686 (1949)
(stating that, if "wrongful actions" of a federal official "are such as to create a personal
liability, whether sounding in tort or in contract, the fact that the officer is an instrumentality
of the sovereign does not, of course, forbid a court from taking jurisdiction over a suit against
him"), superseded by statute, Quiet Title Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-562, 86 Stat. 1176
(1972) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2409a), as recognized in Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273
(1983); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999) ("[Slovereign immunity... bars
suits against States but not lesser entities."); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166-67
(1985) (explaining that official immunity defenses are available to an official sued in his or
[Vol. 37:715
U.S. TORTURE ASA TORT
A suit against an official that seeks to hold that official personally liable in
damages is called a "personal capacity" or an "individual capacity" suit.
25
Sovereign immunity does not bar individual capacity suits against
government officials, even when the suits are based on official conduct.
26
Although sovereign immunity does not bar individual capacity suits,
those suits do face two other obstacles. The first obstacle is stating a cause of
action.27 No federal statute or federal common law doctrine creates a cause
of action specifically for torture by U.S. officials.28 Indeed the only basis for
most torture suits against U.S. officials is the Bivens doctrine, a judicially
created doctrine that authorizes some individual capacity suits for
"constitutional torts.,,29 A second obstacle is the doctrine of official
immunity.3° Official immunity protects officials from suits for money
her individual capacity, but the defense of sovereign immunity is available only when an
official is sued in his or her official capacity).
25. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 166-67 (explaining differences between personal capacity
suits and official capacity suits).
26. See id. at 165 ("Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a
government official for actions he takes under color of state law.").
27. See, e.g., Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) (distinguishing the issue of
stating a cause of action against an official from the issue of whether the official can assert an
immunity defense against that cause of action).
28. The United States is a party to several international agreements banning torture, but
these agreements do not waive U.S. sovereign immunity. See Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v.
United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968-69 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding the Hague Convention did not
waive sovereign immunity); Jama v. INS, 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 364-65 (D.N.J. 1998) (holding
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in combination with the Alien Tort
Statute, did not waive sovereign immunity), affd sub nom. DaSilva v. Esmor Corr. Servs.,
Inc., Nos. 03-3095, 03-4435, 03-3096, 03-3348, 05-4007, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 2182 (3d
Cir. Jan. 27, 2006); cf Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428,
442-43 (1989) (stating that a foreign sovereign does not waive its immunity from suit in U.S.
courts "by signing an international agreement that contains no mention of a waiver of
immunity to suit in United States courts or even the availability of a cause of action in the
United States").
29. See, e.g., Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 73 (2001) (referring to Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics Agency as creating "an
implied constitutional tort remedy"); see also infra Part IV.C (discussing the availability of a
Bivens action for U.S. torture).
30. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 397-98 (1971) (reserving the issue of whether officials "were immune from liability
by virtue of their official position" after recognizing a cause of action against those officials
for violations of the Fourth Amendment); see also infra Part IV.D (discussing whether official
immunity will bar Bivens claims for U.S.-sanctioned torture).
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damages out of their own pocket when claims are based on their official
conduct.3 ' Of relevance here, federal officials can claim absolute official
immunity from state tort claims 32 and qualified official immunity from
Bivens claims.33 Whether or not those immunity defenses will succeed is
explored in Part IV.
As adumbrated in this part of the Article and elaborated below, existing
law treats claims for torture against the United States distinctly from claims
for torture against U.S. officials. Claims against both sets of defendants,
however, are treated as tort claims. The words "torture" and "tort" do have
overlapping etymologies, and torture does fall within the definition of a
tort.34 The problem is that tort law addresses types of wrong that differ
dramatically from official torture.
1I. TORTURE CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES
Sovereign immunity will bar claims against the United States arising
from the three scenarios described in Part I unless the torture victims in those
scenarios establish that the government has waived immunity from their
claims. The only statute that arguably does so is the FTCA.35 Analysis of our
scenarios-and more generally of torture claims against the United States-
under the FTCA must focus on (1) the extent to which the FTPCA makes the
United States liable for the conduct of individuals and (2) the scope of
several exceptions to FrCA liability. Those issues are examined in Part
IH.A-B below.
31. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982) (recognizing the
defense of qualified immunity).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 163-64 (1991) (discussing the
enactment of the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (2000), which gives federal officials
absolute immunity from most non-federal tort claims); see also infra Part IV.B (discussing
non-federal tort claims for U.S. torture).
33. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19 (1980) (stating that prison officials sued
in a Bivens action would have qualified immunity); see also infra Part IV.D.
34. See 2 OxFoRD ENGLISH DICrIONARY, supra note 2, at 3357 (defining "tort" and
"torture").
35. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680.
[Vol. 37:715
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A. Individual Conduct for Which the United States Is Liable Under the
FTCA
The FTCA generally authorizes people to sue the United States for
money damages for certain personal injuries. To be cognizable under the
FrCA, the personal injuries must be caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government
-while acting within the scope of his [or her] office or employment, under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to
the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred.
36
Under the passage quoted above, an FTCA plaintiff must plead and prove:
(1) a negligent or wrongful act or omission, (2) committed by a government
employee, (3) who was acting within the scope of employment. The plaintiff
must also establish that the United States, if a private person, would be liable
to the plaintiff under the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
Congress enacted the FTCA to make the United States liable for
"garden-variety torts" by its employees, such as negligence while driving
government cars.37 Reflecting that homely purpose, the FTCA does not
36. Id. § 1346(b)(1) (giving federal district courts "exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions
on claims against the United States, for money damages," for property damages, and for
personal injuries caused by acts described in the quoted text accompanying this footnote); see
also FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476-77 (1994) (discussing whether a claim was
"cognizable under" § 1346(b)). Although § 1346 is, on its face, just a grant of jurisdiction, it is
actually the "principal provision" of the FTCA. Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 201
(1993) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 6
(1962)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (authorizing agency heads to settle FTCA claims).
Relevant to the claims of the torture victims in the GTMO and Syrian rendition scenarios,
aliens (as well as citizens) can sue under the FTCA. See, e.g., Araujo v. United States, 301 F.
Supp. 2d 1095, 1098-102 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (holding the United States liable to an alien under
the FTCA for wrongful detention).
37. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 706 n.4 (2004) ('The FTCA was passed
with precisely these kinds of garden-variety torts in mind. . . . 'With the expansion of
governmental activities in recent years, it becomes especially important to grant to private
individuals the right to sue the Government in respect to such torts as negligence in the
operation of vehicles."' (quoting S. REP. No. 79-1400, at 31 (1946))); see also Gutierrez de
Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 426 (1995) (stating that the purpose of the FTCA's
exclusivity provision, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1), was to "protect Federal employees from
personal liability for common law torts committed within the scope of their employment"
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create a national tort law tailored to assessing U.S. government liability. The
FTCA does define one important term: "employee of the government., 38 On
other issues of liability, however, the FTCA incorporates the tort law
governing "private persons" in the place where the act or omission occurred,
typically one of the fifty states. 39 This includes the critical determinations of
whether a government employee's act was "negligent or wrongful" and
whether the act was within the scope of employment.4° Because the United
States' liability rests on local tort law governing private persons, a claim that
a government employee acted unconstitutionally is not cognizable under the
FTCA; the Constitution is not a local tort law for private persons.4'
To analyze our scenarios under the FT'CA, let us assume that the conduct
described in those scenarios involves "wrongful acts. 4 2 This assumption
reflects that, in most if not all jurisdictions, torture constitutes the intentional
torts of assault and battery when committed by private persons. 43 The victims
in those scenarios still must prove, first, that the acts were committed by
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Federal Employees Liability
Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-694, § 2(b), 102 Stat. 4363,
4564 (1988))); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139-40 (1950) (describing the impetus
for the FTCA: "As the Federal Government expanded its activities, its agents caused a
multiplying number of remediless wrongs-wrongs which would have been actionable if
inflicted by an individual or a corporation but remediless solely because their perpetrator was
an officer or employee of the Government.").
38. See 28 U.S.C. § 2671.
39. Id. §§ 1346, 2679; see also Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 707 (discussing legislative
history indicating that Congress excluded claims arising in a foreign country from the scope of
the FTCA because it wanted the United States' liability assessed under state tort law, not
foreign tort law).
40. 1 LEsTER S. JAYSON & ROBERT C. LONGSTRETH, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS
§ 8.02 (2005) (noting that state law governs scope-of-employment determinations); id. § 9.09
(noting that state law determines whether a plaintiff has stated a cause of action).
41. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 478 ("[T]he United States simply has not rendered itself liable
under § 1346(b) for constitutional tort claims."); Johnson v. Sawyer, 47 F.3d 716, 727 (5th
Cir. 1995) ("Thus, even a violation of the United States Constitution, actionable under Bivens,
is not within the FTCA unless the complained of conduct is actionable under the local law of
the state where it occurred." (footnote omitted)), vacated, 120 F.3d 1307 (5th Cir. 1997); see
also United States v. Olson, 126 S. Ct. 510 (2005) (holding that FTCA liability cannot rest on
the fact that state law would impose liability on a governmental entity).
42. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2672.
43. Intentional torts qualify as wrongful conduct under the FTCA. See, e.g., Leleux v.
United States, 178 F.3d 750, 755 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding sexual battery actionable under the
FTCA); Duffy v. United States, 966 F.2d 307, 313 (7th Cir. 1992) (rejecting the argument that
intentional torts do not fall within the FrCA).
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government employees and, second, that those employees were acting within
the scope of their employment."a These two requirements will bar FTCA
claims for some of the conduct described in our scenarios.
1. Employees of the Government
The Abu Ghraib and GTMO scenarios involve only U.S. officials.45 The
Syrian rendition scenario involves both U.S. and Syrian officials.
46
The U.S. government is potentially liable under the FTCA for the U.S.
officials' conduct because they are all "employees of the government., 47 The
FTCA defines that term to cover nearly all federal employees in the civilian
and military sectors.48
In contrast, it is not clear whether the Syrian officials in the Syrian
rendition scenario are "employees of the government." The FrCA defines
"employee of the government" to include not only "officers or employees of
any federal agency" but also "persons acting on behalf of a federal agency in
an official capacity." 49 The Syrian officials arguably are acting "on behalf
of' a federal agency-namely, the CIA-when they torture Sami. After all,
the CIA apparently designed its rendition policy to use Syrian officials as
instruments of torture. But even if Syrian officials act "on behalf of' the
CIA, they probably are not doing so "in an official capacity." 50 The CIA
presumably would disclaim the Syrians' conduct. Indeed, the whole point of
the rendition is to avoid having the torture attributed to the United States. For
that reason, it is debatable whether the Syrian officials are acting "in an
official capacity," as required for them to be "employees of the U.S.
44. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2672.
45. See supra Part L.A-B.
46. See supra Part I.C.
47. Section 2671 says in relevant part:
"Employee of the government" includes (1) officers or employees of any federal
agency, members of the military or naval forces of the United States, members of the
National Guard [under some circumstances], and persons acting on behalf of a federal
agency in an official capacity, temporarily or permanently in the service of the United
States, whether with or without compensation, and (2) any officer or employee of a
Federal public defender organization [with some exceptions].
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government" whose conduct can subject the United States to liability under
the FICA.5'
This conclusion gains support from the FTCA provision that defines
"federal agency." 52 "Employees of the government" include "officers or
employees of any federal agency," and the term "federal agency" is defined
to exclude "any contractor with the United States. 53 In the Syrian rendition
scenario, Syria in effect acts as a government contractor when its officials
torture Sami.54 The Syrian officials thus are employees of a government
contractor. By excluding government contractors from the FTCA's definition
of "federal agency," Congress probably intended to preclude employees of
government contractors from being treated as "employees of the
government" under the FTCA.55 To carry out that intent, a court would
probably hold that the Syrian officials in the Syrian rendition scenario are not
51. See id.; see also Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 530-31 (1973) (finding
"some support" in legislative history for the government's argument that the phrase "acting on
behalf of" was designed for "special situations such as the 'dollar-a-year' man who is in the
service of the Government without pay, or an employee of another employer who is placed
under direct supervision of a federal agency pursuant to contract or other arrangement").
52. See 28 U.S.C. § 2671.
53. Section 2671 provides in relevant part:
As used in this chapter and sections 1346(b) and 2401(b) of this title, the term
"Federal agency" includes the executive departments, the judicial and legislative
branches, the military departments, independent establishments of the United States,
and corporations primarily acting as instrumentalities or agencies of the United
States, but does not include any contractor with the United States.
Id.
54. See, e.g., Autery v. United States, 424 F.3d 944, 956-59 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding
that FTCA claims based on companies' improper responses to a wildfire were barred because
the companies were independent contractors, and not employees, of the United States).
55. See Logue, 412 U.S. at 530-32 (rejecting the argument that county employees were
"acting on behalf of" the federal government "in an official capacity" and could therefore be
treated as federal employees, when those employees held a federal prisoner in county jail
under a contract between the federal government and the county); see also Leone v. United
States, 910 F.2d 46, 50-51 (2d Cir. 1990) (refusing to interpret the phrase "acting on behalf
of" as covering private physicians who were designated by the Federal Aviation
Administration as aviation medical examiners and who were found by the court to be
government contractors); Cannon v. United States, 645 F.2d 1128, 1141 n.50 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(refusing to hold that District of Columbia prison officials with custody of federal prisoners
fell within the meaning of "acting on behalf of' in the absence of "special circumstances"
demonstrating detailed federal supervision of federal prisoners in non-federal prisons).
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employees of the government whose conduct could subject the United States
to liability under the FTCA.56
2. Scope of Office or Employment
Not all negligent or wrongful acts by "employees of the government"
expose the United States to liability under the FTCA. The employee must
have been acting "within the scope of his [or her] office or employment.
5 7
The process for determining whether a government employee was acting
within the scope of employment can be complicated. Even so, the U.S.
officials in the GTMO scenario and the Syrian rendition scenario plainly
acted within the scope of employment. A harder question is whether the
officials in the Abu Ghraib scenario acted within the scope of employment.
Scope-of-employment determinations can be complicated because both
federal courts and the Attorney General may be involved in the
determinations. If the plaintiff initially sues a federal employee-and not the
United States-the Attorney General decides whether the employee whose
conduct gave rise to the suit was acting within the scope of employment; the
Attorney General then certifies that determination to the court in which the
case is pending.58 The Attorney General's determination is subject to judicial
review. 59 In contrast, when the plaintiff initially sues the United States
(rather than officials), the Attorney General does not make a scope-of-
employment certification.6° Instead, the court decides the issue by itself, and
56. Although the United States probably cannot be sued under the FTCA for the Syrian
officials' conduct in the Syrian rendition scenario, the United States might be sued under the
FTCA for the conduct of the U.S. officials who turn Sami over to Syria. See Logue, 412 U.S.
at 532-33 (holding in an FTCA case that the court of appeals erred in failing to consider
whether a federal marshal was negligent in failing to arrange for constant surveillance of a
suicidal prisoner held in a county jail under contract with the federal government); see also
United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 151-66 (1963) (holding that federal prisoners could sue
federal prison officials under the FICA); cf. Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir.
1982) (stating in a constitutional tort action against state officials: "If the state puts a man in a
position of danger from private persons and then fails to protect him, it will not be heard to
say that its role was merely passive; it is as much an active tortfeasor as if it had thrown him
into a snake pit.").
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1); see also id. § 2672.
58. Id. § 2679(d)(1); see also 28 C.F.R. §§ 15.1-15.4 (2005) (providing procedures by
the Department of Justice for making scope-of-employment determinations).
59. See Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 423-37 (1995); Primeaux v.
United States, 181 F.3d 876, 878 n.2 (8th Cir. 1999).
60. See Primeaux, 181 F.3d at 878 n.2.
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courts traditionally have based their decision on the law of the state in which
the alleged tort occurred.6' When there is no such state, courts apply the
Restatement (Second) ofAgency.
62
To clear away this underbrush, let us assume that the plaintiffs in our
scenarios initially sue the United States and that the court alone makes the
scope of employment determination by applying Restatement principles.
The U.S. officials in the Syrian rendition scenario, we are told, followed
CIA policy.63 If so, plainly they were acting within the scope of their
61. See, e.g., Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 180-81 (1956) (applying Utah
law in an FTCA case to determine whether federal officials acted within the scope of their
employment). It is debatable whether courts should consult state law, at least when the
employees are members of the Armed Forces. The FTCA says that, for members of the Armed
Forces, "[a]cting within the scope of his office or employment ... means acting in line of
duty." 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (internal quotation marks omitted). It would seem that federal law
alone should determine whether someone is "acting in line of duty" for purposes of the FTCA.
Nonetheless, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Williams v. United States (Williams 11), 350 U.S.
857 (1955), that "the California doctrine of respondeat superior" governed, id. at 857, in an
FTCA case in which a drunken soldier on a recreational drive injured a civilian, and it was
disputed whether the soldier was acting "in line of duty" at the time of the accident, see
Williams v. United States (Williams 1), 215 F.2d 800, 806-08 (9th Cir. 1954), vacated, 350
U.S. 857 (1955). Williams H was a two-sentence, per curiam decision by the Court. 50 U.S. at
857. Nonetheless, lower courts have understood Williams H to establish that state law governs
scope-of-employment determinations under the FTCA. See, e.g., Devlin v. United States, 352
F.3d 525, 533 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[Williams] disposed of the contention that the phrase 'acting
within the scope of his office or employment' was to be interpreted as a matter of federal
law." (alteration in original) (quoting O'Toole v. United States, 284 F.2d 792, 795 (2d Cir.
1960))). The Williams cases pre-date the legislation that authorizes the Attorney General, in
tort suits against federal employees, to certify whether the suit involved conduct within the
scope of employment. See Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-694, §§ 5-6, 102 Stat. 4563, 4564-65 (1988). It is possible that this
legislation, known as the Westfall Act, effectively overrules Williams II, at least for cases in
which the Attorney General has authority to make the certification. See Gutierrez de Martinez,
515 U.S. at 435 (stating that the issue in an FTCA case of "[w]hether the employee was acting
within the scope of his federal employment is a significant federal question" (emphasis
added)); Primeaux, 181 F.3d at 878 n.2 (noting, but reserving, the issue of whether the
Westfall Act, as interpreted in Gutierrez de Martinez, alters the principle attributed to
Williams I that state law governs scope-of-employment determinations in FTCA cases); cf
Aversa v. United States, 99 F.3d 1200, 1208-09 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that Gutierrez de
Martinez did not alter the Williams H principle).
62. JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 40, § 9.07.
63. See supra Part I.C.
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employment. 64 That is true even if they were, at the same time, acting
tortiously or illegally.65
The U.S. interrogators in the GTMO scenario, we are told, reasonably
believed they were using interrogation methods authorized by the
Department of Defense. This is enough to find that they were acting within
the scope of employment. Even if their conduct was actually unauthorized, it
can still be within the scope of their employment.66 What matters is that the
interrogators acted at least in part to benefit their employer.67
It is harder to say whether the military police guards in the Abu Ghraib
scenario acted within the scope of their employment. 68 The description of
this scenario implies that they acted solely to gratify their sadistic urges. If
they did indeed act solely for personal gratification, they acted outside the
scope of their employment.69 That is because, to act within the scope of
employment, an employee must act at least partly to benefit the employer.7°
The Abu Ghraib guards might assert, however, that they were acting at least
partly to benefit their employer, for they acted on instructions to "loosen up"
the prisoner. In general, conduct motivated by such a "dual purpose" may
fall within the scope of employment. 71 The conduct in the Abu Ghraib
scenario still fell outside the scope of employment-even if the guards acted
64. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(1) (1958) ("Conduct of a servant is
within the scope of employment if.. . [among other factors, it] is of the kind he is employed
to perform.").
65. See id. § 231 ("An act may be within the scope of employment although consciously
criminal or tortious.").
66. See id. § 230 ("An act, although forbidden, or done in a forbidden manner, may be
within the scope of employment."); see also, e.g., Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173,
180-81 (1956) (applying Utah law in an FTCA case to hold that federal officials were acting
within the scope of their employment when they seized plaintiffs' horses, even though the
officials' conduct violated federal statutes and therefore exceeded their actual authority;
stating: 'There is an area, albeit a narrow one, in which a government agent, like a private
agent, can act beyond his actual authority and yet within the scope of his employment.").
67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 64, § 228(1)(c) (providing that
to be within the scope of employment, conduct must be "actuated, at least in part, by a
purpose to serve the master").
68. See supra text accompanying note 4.
69. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 64, § 235 ("An act of a servant
is not within the scope of employment if it is done with no intention to perform it as a part of
or incident to a service on account of which he is employed.").
70. See id.
71. See id. § 236 ("Conduct may be within the scope of employment, although done in
part to serve the purposes of the servant or of a third person.").
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partly to benefit their employer-if it involved an unforeseeable, "clearly
inappropriate" crime.72 Thus, the government may well avoid FTCA liability
by proving-as it has actually asserted-that the Abu Ghraib abuse involved
egregious, unforeseeable conduct by a "few bad apples. 73
In sum, the United States cannot be liable under the FTCA for the
conduct in the Abu Ghraib scenario if that conduct was outside the scope of
the guards' employment. The United States might be liable under the FTCA
for the conduct by U.S. officials in the GTMO and Syrian rendition
scenarios. The United States' potential liability in those two scenarios arises
because the scenarios involved conduct by government employees within the
scope of employment. The United States can still avoid liability in those two
scenarios, however, if it shows that they fell within one of the FTCA's
exceptions.
B. FTCA Exceptions
The FTCA generally waives the United States' sovereign immunity from
claims arising from torts committed by government employees while acting
within the scope of their employment. That general waiver, however, is
limited by thirteen exceptions. Several of those exceptions could bar some or
all of the claims arising from the scenarios.
1. The Combatant Activities Exception
The FTCA does not apply to-and thus does not authorize a suit against
the United States for-"[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of
72. See id. § 231 cmt. a; see also H.R. REnP. No. 100-700, at 5 (1988) ("If an employee is
accused of egregious misconduct, rather than mere negligence or poor judgment, then the
United States may not be substituted as the defendant, and the individual employee remains
liable."), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5945, 5949; cf Attallah v. United States, 955 F.2d
776, 780-82 (1 st Cir. 1992) (holding that U.S. customs agents who robbed and killed a courier
entering Puerto Rico were not acting within the scope of their employment for FTCA
purposes).
73. See President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Iraq and the War on
Terror, Address Delivered at United States Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania (May
24, 2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/05120040524-10.html
(stating that Abu Ghraib prison "became a symbol of disgraceful conduct by a few American
troops who dishonored our country and disregarded our values"); see also DANNER, supra
note 1, at 27 (describing this as the "'few bad apples' argument").
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the military or naval forces . . . during time of war.",7 4 This "combatant
activities" exception probably applies during the current war on terrorism,
even though Congress has not declared it a war.75 The toughest question is
whether the detention and interrogation of terrorist suspects are "combatant
,,76
activities.
The answer depends partly on how closely conduct must be related to
battlefield violence for that conduct to qualify as "combatant activity. 77 The
United States has argued with some success that the detention of suspected
combatants lies at the core of combat.78 The United States would no doubt
further argue that, like the detention of combatants, the interrogation of those
74. 28 U.S.C. § 26806) (2000).
75. See, e.g., Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1333-35 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying
the exception during the conflict commonly known as the "tanker war" between the United
States and Iran, even though it was not a declared war); Bentzlin v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 833
F. Supp. 1486, 1492-95 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (applying the exception, by analogy, to claims
against a government contractor that arose during the undeclared Persian Gulf War); Vogelaar
v. United States, 665 F. Supp. 1295, 1302 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (applying the exception to claims
that arose during the undeclared Vietnam War).
76. See 28 U.S.C. § 26800).
77. Cf Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1333 n.5 (finding claims involved "combatant activities"
because they concerned "the tracking, identification, and destruction of unidentified aircraft
that appear[ed] to pose a threat to [a] warship's safety"); Johnson v. United States, 170 F.2d
767, 770 (9th Cir. 1948) ("'[Clombatant activities' ... include not only physical violence, but
activities both necessary to and in direct connection with actual hostilities.") (holding the
exception did not apply to claims based on damage done by U.S. vessels that had finished
their wartime activities and were homeward bound); Bentzlin, 833 F. Supp. at 1489 (applying
the exception, by analogy, to bar claims against a government contractor based on its
manufacture of the missiles that killed service members); Vogelaar, 665 F. Supp. at 1302
(applying the exception to bar claims related to the identification of a service member killed in
the Vietnam War); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1255
(E.D.N.Y. 1984) (declining, at that stage of the litigation, to hold that the exception barred
claims based on, among other conduct, the government's inadequate labeling of Agent
Orange, a defoliant used in the Vietnam War); Skeels v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 372, 374
(W.D. La. 1947) (holding "combatant activities" did not include "mere practice or training
activities, even in time of war" and that the exception therefore did not bar an FTCA claim
based on military airplanes killing a civilian during training in the Gulf of Mexico); Note, The
Federal Tort Claims Act, 56 YALE L.J. 534, 548-49 & n.99 (1947) (discussing the genesis and
possible meaning of "combatant activities").
78. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (stating, in reference to the
President's statutory authority to detain Hamdi, that "the capture and detention of lawful
combatants and the capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants, by 'universal
agreement and practice,' are 'important incident[s] of war"' (alteration in original) (quoting
Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942))).
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combatants for military intelligence is close enough to actual combat to
constitute "combatant activities" by the interrogators. Alternatively, or
additionally, the United States might argue that the interrogations arise from
the "combatant activities" of the detainees, since their involvement in
combat led to their detention and interrogation. These arguments would have
particular force in the Abu Ghraib scenario, because the Abu Ghraib prison
lies in an area of active combat.79
The "detention and interrogation equals combatant activities" argument
has less force in the GTMO scenario. Although U.S. officials captured the
torture victim in that scenario (Ghuljaan) in a place where combat was
occurring (Afghanistan), his place of detention (GTMO) lies far from any
battlefield.8° In addition, the United States exercises control tantamount to
sovereignty over GTMO.81 The government might still argue that the
interrogation of GTMO detainees, like Ghuljaan, who were captured on the
battlefield arise from those detainees' combatant activities. But this argument
seems to be a stretch considering GTMO's remoteness from the battlefield
and the United States' uncontested control over GTMO.
Finally, the Syrian rendition scenario is least likely of the three to fall
within the combatant activities exception. U.S. officials arrested Sami in
New York City, not on the battlefield. They believe he is a terrorist but have
no evidence that he engaged in combatant activities.82 Furthermore, the U.S.
officials who arranged for his rendition are CIA officials, and therefore may
not belong to the "military or naval forces., 83 Thus, although Sami's
rendition may be associated with fighting the war on terrorism, it probably
does not fall within the FTCA's exception for cases arising from combatant
activities.
79. See Schlesinger Report, supra note 1, at 937 (noting that Abu Ghraib was "smack in
the middle of a combat environment").
80. Cf Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (finding
that the "theater of war" concept could not be stretched to enable the President to rely on his
Commander-in-Chief power to seize domestic steel mills).
81. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480 (2004) (relying on United States' "complete
jurisdiction and control" over GTMO in holding that detainees there could sue under the
federal habeas statute).
82. Cf. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430-31 (2004) (addressing the habeas claim
of a person whom U.S. officials arrested in Chicago and detained in the United States as an
"enemy combatant").
83. 28 U.S.C. § 26800) (2000) (excepting claims arising from combatant activities "of
the military or naval forces" in wartime).
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In sum, only the Abu Ghraib scenario stands a good chance of falling
within the combatant activities exception.
2. The Foreign Country Exception
The FTCA does not apply to "any claim arising in a foreign country.
' ' 4
This foreign country exception will bar claims arising from the Abu Ghraib
scenario and some claims arising from the Syrian rendition scenario.
Whether it would bar claims arising from the GTMO scenario is unclear.
The foreign country exception was interpreted broadly in the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.8 5 In Alvarez-Machain, a
Mexican national sued the United States for having him kidnapped from
Mexico in order to prosecute him in the United States. 6 The Court held that
the foreign country exception barred his FTCA claims against the United
States because his abduction-and hence his injury-happened in Mexico.
8 7
It did not matter that the abduction was authorized by officials in the United
States.8 8 For purposes of the foreign country exception, the Court held, an
action arises where the injury occurs, even if the tortious conduct occurred
elsewhere.89 This holding rejected the "headquarters exception" to the
foreign country exception that had developed in some lower courts. 90 That
exception permitted FTCA liability for tortious conduct that occurred
overseas if it were approved by officials at some "headquarters" in the
United States.91
Under Alvarez-Machain, the foreign country exception would immunize
the United States for the torture that occurred at Abu Ghraib. Because the
torture occurred in a foreign country, a claim based on that torture arose in a
foreign country and falls within the exception. It does not matter whether the
torture was authorized in Washington, D.C. Furthermore, Iraq qualifies as a
foreign country even if, at the time of the injuries, it lacked a recognized
84. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k).
85. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
86. Id. at 698-99.
87. Id. at 703-12.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 712 ("[T]he FTCA's foreign country exception bars all claims based on
any injury suffered in a foreign country, regardless of where the tortious act or omission
occurred.").




government.92 Finally, the injuries at Abu Ghraib occurred in a foreign
country even though they occurred inside a U.S.-controlled facility in Iraq.
93
As interpreted in Alvarez-Machain, the foreign country exception also
bars claims for conduct in the Syrian rendition scenario that occurred in
Syria. As true of the Abu Ghraib scenario, it does not matter in the Syrian
rendition scenario that the extraordinary rendition program is devised in
Washington, D.C. Under Alvarez-Machain, claims for the torture itself arose
in Syria because that is where the injury occurred. 94 In effect, the foreign
country exception, as interpreted in Alvarez-Machain, allows the United
States to outsource to other countries the job of torturing suspected
terrorists.
95
True, the foreign country exception does not protect the United States
from FTCA liability for actions by U.S. officials in the United States that led
up to the rendition, including Sami's arrest in New York. This will not be
much comfort to Sami if U.S. officials have probable cause to detain him,
however, because in that event his detention probably is not tortious. 96 Sami
may, however, be able to claim that U.S. officials acted tortiously after they
detained him by arranging for him to be handed him over to foreign officials
who, they knew, would torture him.
97
92. See Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 199, 204-05 (holding the foreign country
exception barred an FTCA claim arising in Antarctica, even though it had no recognized
government or civil law).
93. See United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 219-22 (1949) (holding the foreign
country exception barred a claim arising from an injury occurring at a Newfoundland, Canada,
air base located on land that the United States held under a ninety-nine year lease from Great
Britain).
94. 542 U.S. at 702-10.
95. See Mayer, supra note 8, at 107-08.
96. Cf Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 703-12 (treating plaintiff's FTCA claim for false
arrest as arising in Mexico because, once he was brought into the United States, the United
States then had cause and authority to continue his detention).
97. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 194-200
(1989) (finding that the Due Process Clause generally does not require the government to
protect citizens against private violence, but it does create duties toward people whose liberty
the government has restricted); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794-96 (1966) (holding
that private persons acted under color of law when, in coordination with local law
enforcement officers, they beat to death civil rights workers who had traveled to Philadelphia,
Mississippi); Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 530-32 (5th Cir. 1994)
(discussing case law that recognizes constitutional claims against state entities for creating a
situation in which plaintiff was exposed to danger at the hands of private actors).
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It is unclear whether the foreign country exception would bar claims in
the GTMO scenario. The torture occurred-and, under Alvarez-Machain,
FTCA claims based upon the torture arose-at GTMO. Although GTMO is
in Cuba, it may not constitute "a foreign country" because of the United
States' control over it.
98
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a): The "Discretionary Function Exception"
Section 2680(a) of title 28 states that the FTCA does not apply to
[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation,
whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise
or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function
or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
99
Section 2680(a) is often called the "discretionary function exception,"' ° and
this Article will follow that convention when referring to subsection (a) as a
whole. Section 2680(a) actually contains two exceptions, however, only the
second of which involves discretionary functions.' 0 ' The first part of the
provision, which will hereinafter be referred to as the "due care clause,"
protects the government from certain suits based on an employee's execution
of a statute or regulation. 0 2 The second part, which will hereinafter be
referred to as the "discretionary function clause," protects the government
98. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 487 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("Guantanamo Bay is in every practical respect a United States territory .. "). But cf. Cuban
Am. Bar Ass'n v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1425 (1 1th Cir. 1995) (holding that GTMO is
not a U.S. territory for purposes of statutes relied upon in that case by Cuban and Haitian
immigrants temporarily detained there); Bird v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 338, 340-43 (D.
Conn. 1996) (holding that the foreign country exception barred an FTCA action alleging
medical malpractice at the Naval Medical Facility at GTMO).
99. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2000).
100. See, e.g., United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322 (1991).
101. E.g., Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 32-33 (1953) ("It will be noted...
that there are two phrases describing the excepted acts of government employees."); see also
Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 181 (1956) (separately discussing the two portions of
§ 2680(a)).
102. See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322.
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from certain suits based on an employee's exercise of a discretionary
function.
10 3
The two clauses in § 2680(a) operate somewhat like mirror images. The
first limits suits based on a government employee's simply carrying out
statutory or regulatory duties; the second limits suits based on a government
employee's conduct that, in the absence of controlling statutes or regulations,
involves discretion. Because of their distinctness, the two clauses will be
discussed separately below.
a. Due Care Clause
The due care clause bars FITCA actions based on an employee's exercise
of "due care" in the execution of a statute or regulation, "whether or not such
statute or regulation be valid." °4 The two quoted phrases reflect Congress's
intent to bar suits that seek money damages, not for an employee's lack of
due care in discharging statutory or regulatory duties, but for the employee's
competent discharge of statutory or regulatory duties. In other words,
Congress did not want FTCA tort suits to be used as vehicles for judicially
challenging the validity of statutes or regulations. 05 Consistent with that
intention, the due care clause bars FTCA suits based on official conduct that
is specifically authorized or required by a statute or regulation.'16 In contrast,
if an FICA suit is based upon official conduct that is not dictated by a statute
or regulation but instead involves the exercise of discretion, then the due care
103. See id.
104. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
105. E.g., Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 33 (stating the due care clause "bars tests by tort action
of the legality of statutes and regulations").
106. See Crumpton v. Stone, 59 F.3d 1400, 1403 (D.C. Cir. 1995). According to the
Crumpton court, the due care clause applies if a "'federal statute, regulation, or policy
specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow[]' . . . as long as the
employee has exercised due care in following the dictates of the statute or regulation." Id.
(emphasis added) (quoting Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322); cf. Staton v. United States, 685 F.2d
117, 120-21 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding that the due care clause would bar a claim against a
national park ranger who shot dogs pursuant to regulation, as long as he was exercising due




clause generally will not apply.'07 Such a suit may be barred, however, by the
discretionary function clause. 
08
To apply the due care clause to the torture scenarios in Part I, we must
first ask whether the U.S. officials in those scenarios were executing a
"statute or regulation."' 0 9 It does not appear that any statute specifically
authorizes or compels the officials' conduct. Each scenario does, however,
involve an executive directive. The military police guards in the Abu Ghraib
scenario tortured Ali under an instruction from military intelligence officers
to "loosen him up." 110 The GTMO interrogators tortured Ghuljaan under a
directive from the Secretary of Defense authorizing certain interrogation
methods." CIA officials rendered Sami to Syria under an extraordinary
rendition program approved by the White House." 2 If none of these
directives was a "regulation," then the due care clause will not bar FTCA
claims based on the officials' conduct.
It is not clear which, if any, of these directives is a "regulation."" 3 The
FTCA does not define the term, and there is little case law on the subject."1
4
107. See Crumpton, 59 F.3d at 1404-06 (holding that the due care clause did not apply
because no statute or regulation limited the Army's discretion to disclose records).
108. See infra notes 126-55 and accompanying text.
109. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
110. See supra text accompanying note 4.
111. See supra Part I.B.
112. See supra Part I.C.
113. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
114. Dictionaries contemporaneous with the FTCA's enactment in 1946 shed little
light on the subject. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1451 (4th ed. 1951); MAx RADIN,
RADIN LAW DICTIONARY 290 (Lawrence G. Greene ed., 1955). To the extent that the term
"regulation" is defined broadly to include informal official prescriptions, the due care clause
would create greater tension between the United States' liability under the FTCA and the
liability of local governments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A local government can be held civilly
liable when someone acting on its behalf violates federal rights in the course of executing
"any [local] statute, regulation, custom, or usage," whether or not exercising due care. 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). In contrast, the United States cannot be held civilly liable when an
employee (using due care) commits a tort in executing a "statute or regulation." 28 U.S.C. §
2680(a). It is not clear why local governments should be liable for their officials' execution of
local laws and policies when the United States can use the due care clause to escape liability




The term may refer to what the federal Administrative Procedure Act calls
"substantive rules."' 1 5
On that assumption, of the three directives, the "loosen him up"
instruction in the Abu Ghraib scenario is least likely to qualify as a
"regulation."'1 6 It is the least formal and least detailed of the three
directives.' 17 It came from officials who were presumably fairly low in the
chain of command and therefore may have lacked authority to issue
regulations (as distinguished from having authority to issue orders). 1 8 And,
unlike most regulations, the "loosen him up" instruction did not have broad
applicability; it concerned a specific, identified detainee. 19
By comparison, the Secretary of Defense's directive to GTMO
interrogators and the CIA's extraordinary rendition program governing the
Syrian rendition scenario are more likely to be "regulations" within the
meaning of the due care clause. 120 On the one hand, neither directive is called
a "regulation," and neither is apparently subject to the rule-making
procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act.' 2l On the other hand, the
directives come from officials at the highest levels of the executive branch,
who no doubt intend them to be binding. The Secretary of Defense's
115. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(1)(D), 553(d)(1), 558(b) (2000); see, e.g., Lincoln v. Vigil,
508 U.S. 182, 195-96 (1993) (discussing the distinction between substantive rules and other
types of rules); Dupree v. United States, 247 F.2d 819, 822-25 (3d Cir. 1957) (rejecting an
FrCA claim based on implementation of substantive regulations, even though those
regulations had been held invalid in separate litigation).
116. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
117. See Crumpton v. Stone, 59 F.3d 1400, 1404-05 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting that an
army pamphlet was not "a definitive statement of Army policy" and therefore did not limit the
Army's discretion for purposes of analysis under due care clause and discretionary function
clause of FTCA).
118. See 5 U.S.C. § 558(b) ("A sanction may not be imposed or a substantive rule or
order issued except within jurisdiction delegated to the agency and as authorized by law.");
see also JOHN H. REESE & RICHARD H. SEAMON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
PRAcTICE 517-18 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing the history and purpose of § 558(b)).
119. Although the Administrative Procedure Act defines "rule" to mean an agency
statement of either "general or particular applicability," 5 U.S.C. § 551(4), most rules have
general applicability. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 966 F.2d 1292, 1309 (9th
Cir. 1992).
120. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
121. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (exempting from rule-making requirements prescribed in
that section rules involving "a military or foreign affairs function of the United States").
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directive, in particular, appears to have been issued through the formal chain
of command. 
122
If officials in the GTMO scenario and the Syrian rendition scenario are
executing "regulations," claims against them based on their conduct can still
avoid the "due care" clause if the officials did not "exercis[e] due care.'
123
As between the two scenarios, the GTMO scenario is the more likely to
involve a lack of due care. That is because the Secretary of Defense's
directive (the public version, at least) gave GTMO interrogators much
discretion. The directive described authorized interrogation methods using
only evocative names such as "fear up harsh," and broad descriptions, such
as (in the case of "fear up harsh"), "[slignificantly increasing the fear level in
a detainee." 124 This left officials with so much discretion that, in reality, it led
interrogators in at least one case to kill a detainee.1 25 Focusing on this
discretion in the GTMO scenario, Ghuljaan can argue that his FTCA action
does not challenge the validity of the Secretary of Defense's directive but,
instead, the way his interrogators chose to implement the directive. In short,
he can argue that they did not exercise due care, as required for their conduct
to be protected by the due care clause.
It will be harder for Sami, the victim in the Syrian rendition scenario, to
argue lack of due care. In his case, it is the extraordinary rendition program
itself that caused him to be rendered to a country that tortured him. He
therefore cannot argue that his torture resulted from the way in which the
program is implemented in his particular circumstances. Because his F1TCA
action seems to challenge the validity of the rendition program itself, rather
than a lack of due care in its implementation, the due care clause will
probably bar his action if the program is considered a "regulation" within the
meaning of the due care clause.
122. See supra note 7.
123. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
124. Apr. 16 Memo, supra note 7, at 361. But cf. Tim Golden, Abuse Cases Open
Command Issues at Army Prison, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 8, 2005, at Al ("[A] former guard
charged with maiming and assault said that he and other reservist military policemen were
specifically instructed at Bagram how to deliver the type of blows that killed the two
detainees, and that the strikes were commonly used when prisoners resisted being hooded or
shackled.").
125. See Josh White, Documents Tell of Brutal Improvisation by GIs, WASH. POST,
Aug. 3, 2005, at Al (reporting that U.S. interrogators in Iraq, using the "fear up" method,
killed an Iraqi general by stuffing him in a sleeping bag, wrapping his bagged figure in
electrical cord, and beating him to death).
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b. Discretionary Function Clause
Torture victims asserting FTCA claims may avoid the due care clause
only to have their claims barred by the discretionary function clause.
26
Analysis of torture claims under the discretionary function clause raises
difficult issues at each of three steps: (i) identifying what conduct the claims
are "based upon"; (ii) determining whether that conduct is discretionary; and
(iii) if so, determining whether the conduct involves the kind of discretion
that the discretionary function clause protects.
i. What Conduct FTCA Claims for U.S. Torture Will Be "Based
Upon"
The discretionary function clause bars FTCA claims that are "based upon
the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise of perform a
discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or any
employee of the Government." 127 Thus, to determine whether the clause bars
a claim, a court must first determine what conduct that claim is "based
upon." That determination can be difficult when an FTCA claimant's injuries
stem, not from the single act of a government employee, but from a course
of government conduct. 128 The injurious course of conduct may include some
acts that involve the exercise of a discretionary function and other acts that
do not. In that situation, the determination of which act the claim is "based
upon" can control the outcome of the case.
Our torture scenarios illustrate the "based upon" issue. For example,
assume that the Secretary of Defense exercises a discretionary function when
he authorizes the interrogation techniques used in the GTMO scenario. Also
assume, however, that the GTMO interrogators who tortured Ghuljaan were
not exercising a discretionary function when they applied those techniques
(because, say, the application does not involve the kind of public-policy-
based discretion that, as discussed below, the discretionary function clause
protects). 129 When Ghuljaan sues under the FTCA, he can plausibly argue
that his claim is "based upon" the unprotected conduct of his interrogators.
The United States can just as plausibly respond that his claim is really "based
126. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a); see also text accompanying note 99.
127. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
128. Richard H. Seamon, Causation and the Discretionary Function Exception to the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 30 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 691, 695, 715-17 (1997).
129. See id. at 754-55.
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upon" the Secretary of Defense's decision. If Ghuljaan's argument prevails,
the discretionary function clause will not bar the action. If the United States'
argument prevails, the clause will bar the action. The "based upon" issue can
determine the lawsuit.
Little case law or commentary addresses the "based upon" issue, as I
have discussed in a prior article.130 Under the approach proposed in that
article, an FTCA claim is presumptively "based upon" the injurious
government conduct that, the plaintiff alleges, was negligent or wrongful and
proximately caused his or her injuries. 131 This approach permits a plaintiff to
avoid the discretionary function clause by basing his or her F-ICA claim
upon conduct by officials who are not themselves exercising a discretionary
function but are implementing a policy that did involve the exercise of a
discretionary function. 32 To prevail in that situation, however, the plaintiff
must prove that the implementation of the policy, as distinguished from its
formulation, was negligent or wrongful. Thus, under my proposed approach,
the plaintiff cannot prove that the implementation of a policy was negligent
or wrongful by using evidence, or making arguments to the effect, that the
policy itself was negligent or wrongful. In effect, the antecedent policy must
be conclusively presumed valid if its formulation involved the exercise of a
discretionary function.' 
33
This approach will probably limit, but not altogether bar, an FTCA claim
arising from the GTMO scenario. Ghuljaan, the victim in the GTMO
scenario, can sue the United States under the FTCA for the way that GTMO
interrogators implemented the Secretary of Defense's directive on
interrogation methods. Specifically, Ghuljaan can argue that the interrogators
acted negligently or wrongfully in implementing the directive because (we
are assuming for now) they were not exercising a discretionary function. To
prove negligent or wrongful implementation, however, Ghuljaan cannot
argue, or present evidence, that the directive itself is negligent or wrongful,
because (we are assuming for now) in formulating the directive the Secretary
exercises a discretionary function. Essentially, under my proposed approach,
Ghuljaan is limited to arguing that, judged by a reasonable person standard,
130. See id. at 696-97.
131. Id. at 720 (reading Supreme Court precedent to imply that "[a] claim is
presumptively based upon the government conduct that the plaintiff alleges was wrongful and
proximately caused the injuries").
132. Id. at 754.
133. Id. at 754-55.
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the individual interrogators went too far in their use of the authorized,
vaguely worded (and assumed to be valid) interrogation methods.
My approach to the "based upon" issue will probably bar the FICA
claim arising from the Syrian rendition scenario. Assume that CIA and White
House officials exercised a discretionary function in formulating the
extraordinary rendition program. Also assume that the officials who rendered
Sami to Syria for torture were not exercising a discretionary function
(because, say, they were carrying out merely ministerial functions). The
discretionary function clause would bar an FTCA action by Sami claiming
that the program itself is negligent or wrongful and has proximately caused
his injuries. In theory, the clause would not bar an action claiming that the
officials' implementation of the program was negligent or wrongful and
proximately caused Sami's injury. It probably would be impossible,
however, for Sami to prove that his injuries arose from the negligent or
wrongful implementation of the plan, rather than from the plan itself, the
validity of which must be taken as a given in order for Sami to avoid having
his claim barred by the discretionary function clause. Thus, he would avoid
the potential bar posed by the discretionary function clause only by limiting
his claim to one that would not succeed on the merits.
My approach to the "based upon" issue probably would not bar the
FTCA claim arising from the Abu Ghraib scenario. This is true even if we
make the debatable assumption that military officials exercised a
discretionary function when they instructed the guards to "loosen up" Ali.
Ali can still sue under the FICA claiming that the guards acted negligently
or wrongfully by using that instruction as an excuse to torture him if, as Ali
might establish, the guards' sadistic actions did not involve the type of
discretion that the discretionary function clause protects.1
4
ii. Whether the Conduct Is Discretionary
Once a court identifies what conduct an FTCA action is "based upon,"
the court can then proceed to the second step of analysis under the
discretionary function clause. At the second step, the court must determine
whether the conduct was discretionary. To be discretionary, a government
employee's conduct must involve "choice." 135 Conduct cannot be
discretionary if it violates a federal statute, regulation, or agency guidelines,
134. See infra Part III.B.3.b.iii.
135. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988).
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because an employee has no choice but to obey the law.136 Thus, the
discretionary function exception will not bar claims arising from the Abu
Ghraib scenario, which, we are told, violates federal statutes and
regulations.' 37 Similarly, if the conduct of the interrogators in the GTMO
136. Id. at 542-43 (holding that the discretionary function clause did not bar an FICA
claim alleging that agency officials violated statutes and regulations governing the licensing of
vaccinations); see also United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 324-25 (1999) (noting
discretion may be established expressly or implicitly by "statute, regulation, or agency
guidelines").
137. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. A federal statute imposes criminal
liability on "[w]ho[m]ever outside the United States commits or attempts to commit torture."
18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2000). This anti-torture statute contains no exceptions excusing, for
example, official torture of suspected terrorists. Cf Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1221-22
(9th Cir. 2005) (rejecting an immigration judge's view that torture of an asylum applicant was
justified because it occurred in a combat zone). The Justice Department has nonetheless
argued that the anti-torture statute incorporates common-law defenses that allow some U.S.
torture of suspected terrorists. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen.,
Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the
President, at 39-46 (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Torture Memo]. The same memorandum also
suggests that the statute would be unconstitutional if construed to constrain the President's
conduct of the war against terrorism. See id. at 31-39. Those views have drawn criticism, see,
e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, A World Without Torture, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 641, 646
(2005) (calling the Torture Memo "perhaps the most clearly erroneous legal opinion I have
ever read"), and the Justice Department withdrew the Torture Memo, perhaps in response to
that criticism, see Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of
Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't
of Justice, at 2 (Dec. 30, 2004), but the Torture Memo nonetheless raised important issues
about the reach of the anti-torture statute that the courts have not yet addressed. Until recently,
the government also argued that the anti-torture statute did not apply to conduct at GTMO
because it was not "outside the United States" within the meaning of the statute. See Working
Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of
Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations (Apr. 4, 2003) [hereinafter Working
Group Report], reprinted in TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 1, at 286, 291. Congress enacted a
law in late 2004 to make the anti-torture statute applicable at federal installations such as
GTMO and Abu Ghraib. The 2004 law defines the "United States," for purposes of the anti-
torture statute, to exclude those places. Those places are therefore "outside the United States"
and conduct occurring there is subject to the anti-torture statute. Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 1089,
118 Stat. 1811, 2067 (2004) ("'United States' means the several States of the United States,
the District of Columbia, and the commonwealths, territories, and possessions of the United
States."). In addition, as this Article went to print, Congress banned "cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment" of detainees in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. Pub.
L. 109-148, § 1003(a), 119 Stat. 2680, 2739 (Dec. 30, 2005) (reproduced in relevant part
supra note 1). In addition to the 1994 anti-torture statute and the 2005 Detainee Treatment
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scenario violates federal law, regulations, or agency guidelines, the
discretionary function clause will not bar claims based on the interrogators'
conduct. In that event, the discretionary function clause will not shield the
GTMO interrogators' conduct even though they, unlike the Abu Ghraib
guards, believe they are obeying the law. 138 Likewise, the exception will not
cover the U.S. officials who arrange for Sami's extraordinary rendition if that
conduct violates federal statutes or regulations, even though it followed CIA
policy. 139 Officials have no discretion to violate statutes or regulations.
It is unclear whether the discretionary function clause bars claims for
torture that does not violate any statute, regulation, or agency policy but does
violate the Constitution. Some courts have held that, because government
employees have no discretion to violate the Constitution, the discretionary
function clause does not bar suits alleging unconstitutional conduct.1 40 The
Act, many other federal statutes and military directives may restrict U.S. officials' use of
physical and psychological force against detainees. See Nov. 27 Action Memo, supra note 7,
at 253-55 (summarizing relevant federal statutes); Working Group Report, supra, at 290-302,
325-30 (summarizing relevant federal statutes and Uniform Code of Military Justice
provisions); Fay-Jones Report, supra note 1, at 1033-34 (summarizing relevant military
directives); Charge Sheet for Charles A. Graner, Jr., available at
http://news.www.findlaw.com/hdocsldocs/iraq/graner5l4O4chrg.html (last visited Jan. 26,
2006) (charging a participant in the Abu Ghraib prison abuses with violations of five articles
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice).
138. Cf. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325 (stating that the focus of determining whether an
official's discretion involves the type of discretion that the discretionary function exception
protects "is not on the agent's subjective intent in exercising the discretion").
139. See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act,
1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681, 2822 (1998) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231
note (2000)) ("It shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise
effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial grounds
for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture."); see also Torture
by Proxy, supra note 12, at 118 (discussing the legality of extraordinary rendition); Jimmy
Gurule, Terrorism, Territorial Sovereignty, and the Forcible Apprehension of International
Criminals Abroad, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 457, 470-89 (1994) (same).
140. See Galvin v. Hay, 374 F.3d 739, 758 (9th Cir. 2004) (rejecting the government's
reliance on the discretionary function clause because the court had already held that officials
violated the Constitution, noting "federal officials do not possess discretion to violate
constitutional rights" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Nurse v. United States,
226 F.3d 996, 1002 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000) ("We hold ... that the Constitution can limit the
discretion of federal officials such that the FTCA's discretionary function exception does not
apply."); Sutton v. United States, 819 F.2d 1289, 1293 (5th Cir. 1987) ("[W]e have not
hesitated to conclude that [law enforcement activity] does not fall within the discretionary
function of [28 U.S.C.] § 2680(a) when governmental agents exceed the scope of their
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D.C. Circuit has held, to the contrary, that the discretionary function clause
can shield the United States from FTCA liability for unconstitutional
conduct.' 41 FTCA claims for torture may force a resolution of this important
circuit split.
142
For now, it suffices to emphasize that-counterintuitive as it may be-
under current law governing FTCA claims, officials may have discretion to
torture suspected terrorists. If so, the question becomes whether it is the kind
of discretion that Congress intended the FTCA's discretionary function
clause to protect.
iii. Whether Conduct Involves Protected Discretion
The discretionary function clause does not protect all discretionary
conduct; rather, it protects only discretionary decisions that are "susceptible
to [public] policy analysis" 143-meaning decisions that, by their nature, call
authority as designated by statute or the Constitution."); see also U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v.
United States, 837 F.2d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating, in dicta, that "conduct cannot be
discretionary if it violates the Constitution, a statute, or an applicable regulation"); Pooler v.
United States, 787 F.2d 868, 871 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating, in dicta, that "if the [plaintiff's]
complaints were that agents of the government in the course of an investigation had violated
constitutional rights or federal statutes, the outcome would be different since federal officials
do not possess discretion to commit such violations").
141. See Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 507-16 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (relying on the
discretionary function clause to uphold dismissal of FTCA claims by the former FBI Director
based upon assertedly unconstitutional conduct by the Attorney General and other federal
officials in connection with prosecution of the former FBI Director); see also Moore v.
Valder, 65 F.3d 189, 196-97 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (relying on Gray to hold that the discretionary
function clause barred FTCA claims alleging that a federal prosecutor and postal inspectors
"pressured witnesses into incriminating [plaintiff], concealed and distorted exculpatory
evidence to create a false impression of what he knew about the fraud schemes and withheld
material exculpatory information from him after the grand jury returned an indictment," which
was also the basis for plaintiff's constitutional tort claims against those same officials in their
individual capacities).
142. Another unsettled question is whether conduct can be discretionary even if it
violates international law. The D.C. Circuit has held that conduct that violates international
law can be discretionary. See Macharia v. United States, 334 F.3d 61, 63-68 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(relying on the discretionary function clause to dismiss FTCA claims asserting inadequate
security at the Kenyan Embassy, which was bombed by al Qaeda, and alleging that the
security failures violated international law).
143. See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325.
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for the making of "political, social, and economic judgments."' 44 This
limitation reflects Congress's intention "to prevent judicial 'second-
guessing' of... administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and
political policy through the medium of an action in tort."' 45 The
determination whether a decision involves the kind of discretion that
Congress intended to protect is objective."46 "The focus of the inquiry is not
on the [official's] subjective intent in exercising the discretion ... but on the
nature of the actions taken and on whether they are susceptible to policy
analysis."'
147
The Court's decisions illustrate the type of discretion protected by the
discretionary function clause. In one case, the Court interpreted the clause to
bar claims based on a federal agency's supervision of an ailing savings and
loan institution.148 The Court determined that the agency acted to protect the
institution's depositors and shareholders and to preserve public trust in the
savings and loan industry. 149 Thus, the agency's decision was grounded in
public and economic policy. In another case, the Court interpreted the clause
to bar claims based on the frequency and thoroughness of Federal Aviation
Administration ("FAA") inspections of aircraft. 50 The Court determined that
the inspection program reflected the FAA's attempt to "accommodate[] the





In a third case, the Court held that the exception barred claims based on
government specifications for manufacturing fertilizer for shipment to
Europe as part of the war-recovery plan. 152 The decision to establish the
program was grounded in foreign policy, and the challenged details of its
implementation reflected considerations of public safety and
"practicability."' 153 In all of these cases, the challenged government conduct
involved the exercise of discretion that, by its nature, lent itself to
consideration of social, economic, or political policy and that, therefore, fell
within the discretionary function clause of the FTCA.
144. United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467
U.S. 797, 820 (1984).
145. Id. at 814.
146. See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325.
147. See id. at 325.
148. See id. at 327-34.
149. See id. at 331-33.
150. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814-20.
151. Id. at 820.
152. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 37-43 (1953).
153. See id. at 42.
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This precedent strongly suggests that the formulation of the policies that
have led to the torture of suspected terrorists involves the kind of discretion
that the discretionary function clause protects. The policies are "susceptible
to" considerations of public safety, foreign intelligence needs, military
strategy, and foreign relations. Specifically, the policies reflect the judgment
that traditional interrogation methods sometimes fail to extract from
suspected terrorists information that is necessary to protect the public against
terrorist attacks and to prosecute the war on international terrorism. The
judgments also reflect (or should reflect) consideration of the United States'
obligations under international law and its foreign policy. The resulting
interrogation policies may be bad policies, but they are still protected by the
discretionary function clause. The exception applies to exercises of
discretion that are susceptible to public policy analysis "whether or not the
discretion involved be abused."'
' 54
If U.S. officials did exercise discretionary functions in formulating
policies that led to the torture of suspected terrorists, the discretionary
function clause will limit the victims of that torture to claims asserting that
lower-level officials acted negligently or wrongfully in implementing those
policies. The discretionary function clause will bar even those claims if a
court determines that implementation decisions are susceptible to public
policy considerations. That determination is not far-fetched. For example, the
military police guards authorized to use the "fear up harsh" interrogation
method at Abu Ghraib have discretion in choosing particular techniques for
"[s]ignificantly increasing the fear level in a detainee." 155 In choosing a
technique, a reasonable guard might very well consider factors such as the
likelihood that the detainee has information the disclosure of which is
necessary to protect human lives and the likely public reaction if details of a
highly coercive interrogation become public. If so, the guard herself is
exercising a discretionary function and a claim based upon her conduct will
therefore be barred by the discretionary function clause.
c. Summary of Analysis Under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)
Analysis of our scenarios under the "discretionary function exception" in
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) raises many important and unresolved issues involving
the meaning of each of the two clauses in that provision. The "due care"
154. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2000).
155. Apr. 16 Memo, supra note 7, at 361.
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clause may well bar claims arising from the GTMO and Syrian rendition
scenarios if the torture in those scenarios entailed the execution of
"regulations" by officials using "due care." Alternatively, the "discretionary
function" clause might bar claims arising from the GTMO and Syrian
rendition scenarios. This depends on, among other issues, (1) whether the
torture in those two scenarios violates any federal statutes or regulations; (2)
whether the discretionary function clause applies to conduct that violates the
Constitution; and (3) if so, whether the torture in the two scenarios violates
the Constitution. Neither the "due care" clause nor the "discretionary
function" clause will likely bar FTCA claims arising from the Abu Ghraib
scenario, because the officials in that case probably were not executing any
statute or regulation; even if they were executing a "regulation," they
arguably did not exercise "due care"; and, assuming their conduct was
discretionary, it may not have involved the kind of discretion that the
discretionary function exception was designed to protect. 156
4. The Intentional Tort Exception
The intentional tort exception says that, in general, the FTCA does not
apply to "[any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, [or]
false arrest."'' 57 This restriction on the FTCA's scope is qualified, however,
by what is called the "law enforcement proviso," which states: "Provided,
[t]hat, with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement
officers of the United States Government, the provisions of this chapter and
section 1346(b) of this title shall apply to any claim arising. .. out of assault,
,,158
battery, false imprisonment, [or] false arrest .... The law enforcement
proviso creates an exception to the intentional tort exception. In other words,
the intentional tort exception does not bar FTCA claims for intentional torts
that fall within the law enforcement proviso. For example, the proviso lets
156. As discussed in previous sections, however, FTCA claims arising from the Abu
Ghraib scenario will be barred because of the foreign country exception and, in addition,
might be barred because the conduct in that scenario was not within the officials' scope of
employment. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text (explaining that the United States
might not be liable under the FTCA for torture by Abu Ghraib guards because the guards
might have acted outside the scope of their employment); see also supra notes 84-93 and
accompanying text (explaining that, even if claims arising from Abu Ghraib scenario are
cognizable under the FTCA, those claims will be barred by the FTCA's foreign country
exception).
157. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).
158. Id.
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victims of brutality by federal law enforcement officers sue the United States
under the FTCA for money damages payable out of the Treasury without
having the claim barred by the intentional torts exception.159 More generally,
the proviso prevents the intentional torts exception from barring claims for
the wrongful conduct of law enforcement officials.
Consistent with our earlier assumption,16° let us assume the torture in our
scenarios constitutes "assault" and "battery" within the meaning of the
intentional tort exception. On that assumption, analysis of our scenarios
proceeds in two steps. First we must determine whether the officials who
inflicted the torture are "investigative or law enforcement officers of the
United States Government."16' If not, FTCA claims against the United States
based on their commission of assault and battery will be barred by the
intentional tort exception. If, on the other hand, the officials who inflicted the
torture are "investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States
Government,"1 62 the intentional tort exception will not bar those FTCA
claims, because they will fall within the law enforcement proviso. A second
question will then arise. The second question is whether a case that falls
within the law enforcement proviso-though not barred by the intentional
tort exception-can still be barred by other FTCA exceptions, such as the
combatant activities exception, the foreign country exception, or the
discretionary function exception.
The FTCA defines "investigative or law enforcement officers" to mean
''any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute
searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of federal
law.' 63 Thus, the United States can use the intentional tort exception to
avoid FITCA liability for torture by having it done by people who lack law
159. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19-20 (1980) (holding that the availability of
remedy under the FrCA for deliberate indifference to the medical needs of a federal prisoner
did not prevent recovery under Bivens for same conduct, and stating that the enactment of law
enforcement proviso shows that "Congress views FTCA and Bivens as parallel,
complementary causes of action"); see also S. REP. No. 93-588, at 3 (1973) (stating that law
enforcement proviso "should be viewed as a counterpart to the Bivens case and its progenty
[sic], in that it waives the defense of sovereign immunity so as to make the [g]ovemment
independently liable in damages for the same type of conduct that is alleged to have occurred
in Bivens (and for which that case imposes liability upon the individual [g]overnment officials
involved)").
160. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.





enforcement powers. This may not be hard for the United States to do. For
instance, some of the military police who tortured Ali in the Abu Ghraib
scenario may have lacked law enforcement powers.164 Furthermore, the CIA
officials in the Syrian rendition scenario almost certainly lack law
enforcement powers.' 65 If these officials are not law enforcement officials,
their intentionally tortious conduct toward Ali and Sami cannot trigger
FTCA liability because it falls within the intentional tort exception.
Because of the law enforcement proviso, however, the intentional tort
exception will not bar an FICA suit for assault and battery by officials who
have law enforcement powers. Suppose, for example, that the interrogators in
the GTMO scenario had arrest powers. In that event, the intentional tort
exception will not bar an FTCA suit against the United States for their
assault and battery of Ghuljaan. The scenario would fall within the law
enforcement proviso. A separate question would then arise: Can a case that
falls within the law enforcement proviso-and that therefore is not barred by
the intentional tort exception-be barred by other FTCA exceptions, such as
the combatant activities exception, the foreign country exception, or the
discretionary function exceptions?
166
This issue divides the federal courts of appeals as it pertains to the
relationship between the law enforcement proviso and the discretionary
function exception. The Fifth Circuit has held that claims that fall within the
law enforcement proviso cannot be barred by the FTCA's discretionary
function exception. 67 The D.C. Circuit and the Fourth Circuit have held, to
164. See 10 U.S.C. § 807(b) (2000) (authorizing "[a]ny person authorized under
regulations governing the armed forces to apprehend persons subject to [the Uniform Code of
Military Justice] or to trial thereunder [based] upon reasonable belief that an offense has been
committed and that the person apprehended committed it"); 32 C.F.R. § 637.10 (2005)
(authorizing military police investigators and Army civilian detectives/investigators "to make
apprehensions in accordance with Article 7 [of the] Uniform Code of Military Justice").
165. See 50 U.S.C. § 403-3(d)(1) (2000) ("[T]he [Central Intelligence] Agency shall
have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions.").
166. See supra notes 74-156 (discussing the combatant activities exception, foreign
country exception, and discretionary function exceptions).
167. See Sutton v. United States, 819 F.2d 1289, 1297 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding the
FrCA's discretionary function clause does not bar cases within the law enforcement proviso);
see also Wright v. United States, 719 F.2d 1032, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 1983) (interpreting the
FTCA exception for assessment or collection of taxes narrowly in order to prevent it from
barring an FTCA action that fell within the law enforcement proviso). But cf Gasho v. United
States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1434-35 (9th Cir. 1994) (reading Wright narrowly and apparently siding
with contrary precedent of Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
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the contrary, that claims that fall within the law enforcement proviso can be
barred by the discretionary function exception.168 The reasoning of the courts
on both sides of the issue could extend to exceptions other than the
discretionary function exception, such as the foreign country exception and
the combatant activities exception.'
69
Because this issue concerns the scope of the intentional tort exception,
the issue has great importance for FTCA claims for torture, which will
invariably "aris[e] out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, [or] false
arrest' ' 170 and therefore implicate the exception. Under the Fifth Circuit's
view, it appears that FTCA claims involving torture by law enforcement
officials acting within the scope of their employment can never be defeated
by any of the FTCA's exceptions. Under the contrary view of other circuits,
those claims can be defeated by one of the other exceptions, at least three of
which-the combatant activities exception, the foreign country exception,
and the discretionary function exception-will bar many torture claims under
the FTCA.
C. Summary of United States' Liability Under Current Law
The FTCA is the only statute under which the United States might be
held civilly liable for U.S.-sanctioned torture. The word "might" in the
previous sentence needs emphasis. In practice, the United States will avoid
FTrCA liability entirely for most U.S.-sanctioned torture, as becomes clear
when the scenarios described in Part I are analyzed under the FTCA.
Specifically, FTCA claims arising from the Abu Ghraib scenario will fail
because, among other reasons, they arise in a foreign country. FTCA claims
arising from the GTMO scenario will fail if they are found to arise in a
foreign country or to be based upon the acts or omissions of officials who
have exercised due care in executing regulations or upon the exercise of a
discretionary function. Some FTCA claims arising from the Syrian rendition
scenario will fail because they arise in a foreign country or because they
168. See Gray, 712 F.2d at 507-08 (rejecting plaintiff's argument that the discretionary
function clause cannot apply to suits that fall within the law enforcement proviso); see also
Medina v. United States, 259 F.3d 220, 224-26 (4th Cir. 2001) (siding with Gray); cf Pooler
v. United States, 787 F.2d 868, 872 (3d Cir. 1986) (reserving this issue).
169. See Welch v. United States, 409 F.3d 646, 651-52 (4th Cir. 2005) (relying on
Medina to hold that due care clause can bar claims that fall within law enforcement proviso),
cert. denied, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 1843 (Feb. 27, 2006).
170. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2000).
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involve acts or omissions by people who are not U.S. government
employees. Other FICA claims arising from the Syrian rendition scenario
will likely fail because they fall within the "due care" or the "discretionary
function" clause of the discretionary function exception or within the
intentional tort exception. In short, FTCA claims for U.S.-sanctioned torture
face a set of obstacles that collectively will bar most FTCA claims.
D. Adequacy of FTCA Actions for U.S.-Sanctioned Torture
Neither the FTCA in particular nor tort law in general is adequate for the
adjudication of claims against the United States for U.S.-sanctioned torture.
1. The Inadequacy of the FTCA as a Vehicle for Remedying U.S.-
Sanctioned Torture
Part lI.C establishes that the FTCA generally does not provide a remedy
against the United States for U.S.-sanctioned torture. This does not reflect a
congressional judgment that the United States should not be liable for U.S.-
sanctioned torture. Rather, it simply reflects that the FTCA was not designed
with torture in mind.
The FTCA-in both its general rule of liability and its exceptions-
reflects Congress's intention to make the United States liable for the
"garden-variety" torts of its employees, such as the negligent operation of
government vehicles. 7 1 Although Congress regarded government liability
for the routine torts of federal employees as generally desirable, Congress
created numerous exceptions where, in its estimation, the important
governmental interests in avoiding liability outweighed the interest in
providing a remedy to the victims of these routine torts.172 The point is that
this weighing was done with garden variety torts in mind, not U.S.-
sanctioned torture. It is one thing to say that a governmental interest is strong
enough to justify denying relief for an employee's ordinary, on-the-job
negligence. That same governmental interest is not necessarily strong enough
to justify denying relief for an employee who tortures another person in the
171. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 707 n.4 (2004).
172. See Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 858 (1984) ("The three objectives most
often mentioned in the legislative history as rationales for the enumerated exceptions are:
ensuring that certain governmental activities not be disrupted by the threat of damages suits;
avoiding exposure of the United States to liability for excessive or fraudulent claims; and not
extending the coverage of the Act to suits for which adequate remedies were already
available." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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reasonable belief that the torture is authorized-indeed mandated-by higher
level U.S. officials. In short, applying the FrCA to United States claims for
U.S.-sanctioned torture rests on misconceiving such torture as merely
another garden-variety tort. The fact that remedies for such torture are
seldom available under the FFCA reflects only that Congress did not design
the FTCA with torture in mind; it does not necessarily reflect Congress's
judgment that remedies for torture are inappropriate.
Congress amended the FTCA in 1974 by adding the law enforcement
proviso to the intentional torts exception, which makes the United States
liable in some cases of police brutality. 73 The law enforcement proviso,
however, is inadequate to address torture claims comprehensively for two
reasons. First, as discussed above, current law does not settle the relationship
between the law enforcement proviso and other FTCA exceptions. 74 For
example, can an FTCA claim for an FBI agent's assault upon a suspected
terrorist be barred if it occurs in a foreign country? It is not the mere
existence of a circuit split on this issue that demonstrates the inadequacy of
the law enforcement proviso. Rather, the issue reflects the distinct possibility
that little congressional thought went into the proviso. 75 The proviso is, after
all, just a proviso. 76 It should not bear the weight of grave and complex
matters such as claims of torture arising from the war on terrorism. 1
77
Second, the subject that Congress designed the law enforcement proviso
to address-intentional torts by law enforcement officials-differs from the
torture of suspected international terrorists in ways that matter under the
173. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h); see also supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
175. See Sutton v. United States, 819 F.2d 1289, 1295-96 (5th Cir. 1987) (explaining
that the law enforcement proviso was added as a "non-germane amendment" to legislation in
the House of Representatives and accordingly got little attention there but did receive
consideration by a senate committee); Jack Boger, Mark Gitenstein & Paul Verkuil, The
Federal Tort Claims Act Intentional Torts Amendment: An Interpretative Analysis, 54 N.C. L.
REv. 497, 520 (1976) ("Because of a perhaps hasty decision to draft this [law enforcement
proviso] . . . several key assumptions of the new amendment's drafters almost certainly lack
foundation.").
176. See S. REP. No. 93-588, at 4 (1973) (describing the proviso as "a minimal first
step in providing a remedy against the Federal Government for innocent victims of Federal
law enforcement abuses"); see also Boger, Gitenstein & Verkuil, supra note 175, at 516
("[T]he narrow parameters of [the law enforcement proviso] ... meant that the drafters did not
direct attention to the peculiar idiosyncrasies of the Federal Tort Claims Act.").
177. See Sutton, 819 F.2d at 1295 n. 1I (explaining that "[t]he primary motivation" for




FTCA and that would matter to Congress today. In isolation, the law
enforcement proviso seems to authorize FTCA claims based on intentional
torts by law enforcement officials. Other FTCA provisions, however, bar
claims arising from certain combatant activities and claims arising in foreign
countries. 178 Those provisions at the very least raise the question whether
official conduct committed in the international war on terrorism should be
treated like ordinary federal law enforcement conduct. The question becomes
all the more pressing in light of post-9/11 legislation that treats the United
States' response to international terrorism more like a war than a law-
enforcement problem. 1
79
2. The Inadequacy of Tort Law as a Remedy for Torture
The inability of the FTCA to handle torture claims does not reflect any
fault in the statute or shortsightedness by the FTCA's drafters. Rather, U.S.-
sanctioned torture differs fundamentally from a "garden-variety" tort for
which the FTCA was designed. We can identify at least four differences.
The first difference concerns the locus of fault and whether it is episodic
or recurring. Traditional types of torts, such as intentional torts, are typically
episodic wrongs committed by one private individual against another private
individual. Accordingly, traditional tort law rests on a highly atomistic
concept of fault and injury. It bases liability on a particularized determination
that an identified defendant breached his or her duty to an identified plaintiff
and proximately caused specified injuries. This atomistic conception does
not fit official torture, which is typically systematic and systemic.
Furthermore, torts do not by their nature arise from an imbalance in power.
Official torture, in contrast, is made possible by laws empowering the
government lawfully to detain people, employing officials (guards, etc.)
whose conduct toward detainees would be unlawful if it occurred outside that
setting. Although no governments expressly sanction torture, a bureaucratic
culture can spawn torture through action and inaction by many difficult-to-
identify people over a long period of time. 180 If torture is treated as a tort, it
178. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j)-(k).
179. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001).
180. See Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 2271, 2323 (1990) ("[Glovemmental choices, however harmful, are more often made
by the interaction of several people acting in good faith than by a single malevolent person
.... .); see also Jane Mayer, A Deadly Interrogation, NEW YORKER, Nov. 14, 2005, at 47
(quoting the former general counsel of the CIA as stating that the Abu Ghraib abuse "has its
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seems reasonable to impose liability on the individual torturer. If torture is
instead treated as an institutional failure, it makes more sense to impose
liability on the enterprise.
The second difference between tort and torture concerns the scope and
nature of the harm. Because official torture often occurs as an extension (or
perversion) of law-enforcement activities, it can in practice become
indistinguishable from other legitimate forms of governance. 81 For that
reason, torture, unlike ordinary torts, spreads its harm beyond the individual
torturer and torture victim to the society that employs the torturer and to
those who share the characteristic or engage in the same conduct that leads
the victim to be targeted for torture. This difference implies that tort law in
inadequate not only in its focus on identifying individual tortfeasors to bear
liability but also in treating the tortfeasor's duty as running only to a single,
identified defendant. More fundamentally, tort law treats the occurrence of
torts as inevitable albeit unfortunate-"Torts happen"-and as events that
ordinarily necessitate no punishment, only a compensatory wealth transfer.
Torture should not be treated as routine or as an act that can be adequately
remedied by a compensatory monetary payment.
182
The third difference between tort and torture concerns the source and
nature of the respective legal restrictions on them. Tort law is predominantly
local and judge-made. 183 In contrast, the laws on torture are both universal
roots at the top"); Jane Mayer, The Memo, NEW YORKER, Feb. 27, 2006, at 32, 33 (describing
a memorandum by Alberto J. Mora, then-General Counsel of the Navy, showing that "almost
from the start of the Administration's war on terror the White House, the Justice Department,
and the Department of Defense, intent upon having greater flexibility, charted a legally
questionable course" in dealing with treatment of those detained in the war on terror).
181. See ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE
WORLD 56-59 (1985) (explaining that torture is designed to translate or transform individual
human suffering into "an emblem of the regime's strength").
182. See Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White
House, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1681, 1718-38 (2005) (arguing that prohibition on torture is
"archetypal"); cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 392-93 (1971) (contrasting remedies for Fourth Amendment violations from
remedies for state torts); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring)
("[D]eprivation of a constitutional right is significantly different from and more serious than a
violation of a state right and therefore deserves a different remedy even though the same act
may constitute both a state tort and the deprivation of a constitutional right.").
183. See Ronald W. Eades, Attempts to Federalize and Codify Tort Law, 36 TORT &
INS. L.J. 1, 2 & n.9 (2000) (praising the "ability of tort law to grow and change with the times"
and tracing this ability to "two important factors: tort law is court-created common law, and
tort law is local law.").
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and uniform in the sense that virtually all countries prohibit torture rather
than regulating it. Furthermore, these laws are not predominantly judicially
created. They are legislative and administrative, befitting the need to prevent
torture-as distinguished from "remedying" it after it occurs-through
broadly applicable rules-as distinguished from adjudicatory
pronouncements-that are implemented by regulations, policy guidance, and
training throughout large bureaucracies-as distinguished from the after-the-
fact execution of monetary judgments against individuals found responsible
for torture. Using tort law to remedy torture is like using nuisance law to
handle the generation and disposal of hazardous wastes. In each situation, the
problem is simply much bigger and badder than the problems for which the
law was designed.
184
E. A Proposed Reform of the Law on Torture Claims Against the United
States
For the reasons discussed in Part III.D, the law governing torture claims
against the United States should be tied to something other than the local tort
law for "a private person."1 85 Torture should be treated for what it is: a civil
rights and a human rights violation. Specifically, I propose that the United
States should be liable for torture at least under the same circumstances that
local governments (e.g., cities and counties) would be under the civil rights
statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 states, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
184. Congress recognized the international character of the prohibition on torture when
it created a civil remedy against certain foreign sovereigns whose officials engage in torture.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2000). The provision, added in 1996, waived foreign sovereign
immunity from certain torture claims. See 142 CONG. REc. S3463-64 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1996)
(statement of Rep. Brown) (stating, in regard to a proposed bill that would waive foreign
sovereign immunity for claims of torture against officials of countries designated as state
sponsors of terrorism: "The international community ... does not recognize the right of any
state to commit acts of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, or hostage taking.
Sovereign immunity is an act of trust among nations of good faith. When a terrorist state
harbors or supports known terrorists, or injures or kills American citizens, it destroys that trust
and should not be allowed to avoid the accusations of those it harms.").
185. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2000).
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immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress .... 1 86
I propose a federal statute that could take one of two forms. The broader
form would be identical to § 1983 except that it would apply to persons
acting under color of federal law, rather than state (or territorial or D.C.)
law. 87 A narrower version would create a cause of action against any person
acting under color of federal law who "subjects, or causes to be subjected,"
another person to "torture," a term that would be defined-either in the same
statute or by reference to one of the existing statutory definitions of the
term. 188
To understand these proposals for a federal analogue to § 1983 requires
an understanding of how § 1983 applies to units of local government. To
begin with, I propose that the United States' liability be tied to that of local
governments, rather than states, under § 1983 because states cannot be held
liable under § 1983; the U.S. Supreme Court has held that states are not
"persons" within the meaning of the statute.1 89 I believe that the United
States should be civilly liable for at least some torture inflicted by people
acting under color of federal law. That belief rests on the view, expressed
above, that torture typically results from systemic problems; it is seldom the
sole result of "a few bad apples." 190 It is therefore fair for the system to bear
responsibility for the torture. Awards of money judgments in civil actions are
186. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
187. In its broad form, my proposed legislation would state:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of the United States, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
In its narrower form, my proposed legislation would be identical to the broad form except to
substitute the word "torture" for the phrase "the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the constitution and laws." Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and
Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1512-19 (1987) (arguing that states should enact "converse-
1983" statutes exposing federal agents to civil liability for constitutional violations).
188. See TVPA, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 3(b), 106 Stat. 73, 73 (1992) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1350 note (2000)).
189. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,71 (1989).
190. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
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an appropriate way to hold the government responsible for torture. They
compensate torture victims (to the extent their injuries are compensable).
They symbolically represent the United States' acknowledgment of
responsibility, as determined by an independent judiciary. And, the threat of
civil liability may encourage the government to adopt measures to prevent
torture by its officials.' 9'
A federal analog of § 1983 could be used to hold the United States liable
for torture by those acting on its behalf even though no federal law or official
policy expressly condones torture. As the Supreme Court has interpreted §
1983, a local government can be held liable for violation of federal rights if it
has an unwritten "custom" or "policy" that causes the violation. 92 The
victim of the violation can establish a causal link between the custom or
policy and the harm by showing that those responsible for the custom or
policy were "deliberately indifferent" to the risk that the custom or policy
would lead to the violation. 193 This principle has obvious potential
application to the torture that has occurred at places such as Abu Ghraib.
There is a strong argument that those who made the policy expressed in the
torture memorandum and subsidiary policies (concerning, for example, the
training and assignment of those who guarded detainees) were deliberately
indifferent to the risk that those policies would lead to the torture of
detainees. 194
More generally, tying U.S. liability for U.S.-sanctioned torture to a
statute modeled on § 1983, as it applies to local governments, would improve
current law in three ways. First, even under the current, fairly restrictive
interpretation of § 1983, a federal analog would make the United States itself
liable for at least some of the torture committed on its behalf. Second, a
federal analog of § 1983 would shift the standard of liability away from
private tort law-which for reasons discussed above is inadequate-to one
based on violation of rights arising from the U.S. Constitution and federal
statutes (and perhaps federal regulations, as well). There already exist many
federal constitutional doctrines and federal statutes limiting the inhumane
191. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992) ("The purpose of § 1983 is to deter
state actors from... depriv[ing] individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide
relief to victims if such deterrence fails.").
192. See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997).
193. See id. at 407.
194. Cf. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989) (holding that municipality
could be liable under § 1983 for its failure to train its police officers). The torture memo is
discussed supra note 137.
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treatment of detainees. 195 The statutes and regulations can provide a
particularly useful standard for assessing civil liability. After all, many of the
statutes and regulations will be more specific than the constitutional
provisions bearing on torture (e.g., "cruel and unusual punishment"), and
federal officials can reasonably be expected to know them. Third, a federal
analog to § 1983 would give courts remedial powers that they do not have in
tort actions. Section 1983 authorizes not only "action[s] at law," but also
"suit[s] in equity or other proper proceeding[s] for redress."'1 96 Section 1983
thus empowers courts to grant injunctive and other equitable relief in
appropriate cases. 97 By allowing the courts to do more than grant money
damages, § 1983 can help prevent a situation in which the government could
freely engage in torture as long as it was willing to pay after the fact.
In proposing a federal analog of § 1983 to deal with U.S.-sanctioned
torture, I accept the case law that-severely and unjustifiably, according to
many commentators-limits its utility in remedying civil rights violations by
local government. 198 That is not because I agree with all of that case law, but
195. See supra note 137.
196. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
197. See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242-43 (1972) (holding that federal
courts can grant injunctive relief under § 1983, notwithstanding the Anti-Injunction Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2283 (2000), because § 1983 falls within the Act's exception authorizing injunctions
against state court proceedings if "expressly authorized by Act of Congress"); see also Moor
v. Alameda County, 411 U.S. 693, 723 (1979) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that even
under precedent, later overruled, which held that municipalities are not "persons" within
meaning of § 1983, "[c]ertainly a residuum of power seems available in § 1983 to enjoin such
bizarre conduct as the offering to the police of classes in torture").
198. Indeed, one significant strand of criticism faults the Court for relying too heavily
on tort law in construing § 1983. See Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse: The Move
from Constitution to Tort, 77 GEO. L.J. 1719, 1720 (1989) (arguing that "the Court, by using
tort rhetoric, is attempting to marginalize § 1983 and to make it less protective of [Flourteenth
[A]mendment rights"); see also David Jacks Achtenberg, Taking History Seriously: Municipal
Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Debate over Respondeat Superior, 73 FoRDHAM L.
REv. 2183, 2196-228 (2005) (arguing that current doctrines of municipal liability under §
1983 rest on a misunderstanding of the common law background against which § 1983 was
enacted); Susan Bandes, Not Enough Blame to Go Around: Reflections on Requiring
Purposeful Government Conduct, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1195, 1209 (2003) (stating that
"[miunicipal liability jurisprudence [under § 1983] relies on... misleading models ... [such
as] tort models that erase the difference between private wrongs and constitutional harm");
Mark R. Brown, The Failure of Fault Under § 1983: Municipal Liability for State Law
Enforcement, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1503, 1506 (1999) (broadly criticizing fault-based regimes
for assessing state and local governmental liability for constitutional wrongs); Larry Kramer
& Alan 0. Sykes, Municipal Liability Under § 1983: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 1987
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because I seek a proposal that treats the federal government comparably to
local government and that, based on the principle of comparable treatment,
may be politically feasible. The principle of equal treatment strongly argues
in favor of holding the United States liable for torture under the same
circumstances that a city or a county can be held liable for police brutality.
Most people know that police brutality can, in some instances, amount to
torture, and many would agree that, at least in some circumstances, the
government that employs the offending officer(s) should be held responsible.
It is hard to argue, even in this post-9/1 1 world, that the United States should
escape liability in similar circumstances. For that reason, I believe that a
federal analog to § 1983, at least one limited to violations of a federally
defined right to be free of torture, would be politically feasible and would
represent a significant improvement in existing law.
My proposal to create civil remedies against the United States for U.S.-
sanctioned torture comparable to remedies against local government for
police brutality leaves many hard questions. The hard questions arise under §
1983 as currently interpreted. 99 The main idea behind the proposal is to
provide an example of a way that the law applicable to torture claims can
take a more useful direction than the current law. Under the current regime,
remedies for torture are almost nonexistent because it was designed with
mere torts, not torture, in mind.
IV. TORTURE CLAIMS AGAINST U.S. OFFICIALS
As discussed in Part II, sovereign immunity will bar nearly all civil
claims against the United States for U.S.-sanctioned torture.2° Sovereign
immunity does not, however, bar claims for money damages against the U.S.
Sup. CT. REv. 249, 300 (concluding that "[t]he rules presently governing the imposition of
municipal liability in constitutional tort cases are hopelessly flawed"); Symposium, Section
1983 Municipal Liability in Civil Rights Litigation, 48 DEPAUL L. REv. 619 (1999); Christina
Brooks Whitman, Emphasizing the Constitutional in Constitutional Torts, 72 Cfu.-KENT L.
REv. 661, 661 (1997) (arguing that "torts is a distraction" in constructing a useful model for
constitutional litigation); cf Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Theodore Y. Blumoff, Reshaping Section
1983's Asymmetry, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 755, 760 (1992) ("We suggest borrowing from
contemporary tort law to flesh out . . . [§ 19831's most basic standard of liability and
defense.").
199. Perhaps the most important and difficult of those questions is whether the Court
has properly rejected local government liability based on respondeat superior. See FALLON ET"
AL., supra note 14, at 1090-91.
200. See supra Part III.
[Vol. 37:715
U.S. TORTURE ASA TORT
officials who commit torture in our scenarios. 20' Rather, plaintiffs suing
officials face two other challenges: stating a cause of action and overcoming
the defense of official immunity. °2 This Part discusses three possible sources
for a cause of action for torture victims: the Alien Tort Statute, non-federal
tort law, and constitutional tort claims under the Bivens doctrine. Discussion
of those potential sources for a cause of action focuses on the torture
scenarios described in Part I. As that focus illustrates, torture victims
generally will be able to assert viable causes of action, if at all, only under
the Bivens doctrine. Furthermore, most Bivens claims by torture victims will
fail because of limitations on constitutional rights or limits on the scope of
the Bivens remedy. The upshot is that there is only a small residue of
situations in which an official who committed torture can be held personally
liable: namely, low-level rogue officials who will often be judgment-proof.
This Part assesses the adequacy of current law governing the liability of U.S.
officials who torture suspected terrorists and suggests improvements.
A. The Alien Tort Statute
Two of the torture victims in our scenarios are not U.S. citizens:
Ghuljaan and Sami, the victims in the GTMO and Syrian rendition scenarios.
As aliens, they might consider suing the responsible officials under the Alien
Tort Statute ("ATS"). The ATS authorizes aliens to bring tort suits in federal
court for certain violations of international law, stating: "The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States."20 3
The Supreme Court recently construed the ATS in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain.204 The Court held that the ATS authorizes federal courts to
adjudicate tort claims for some violations of universally accepted and clearly
205defined principles of international law. The Court named torture as anexample of such a violation. 206 The Court's decision in Alvarez-Machain
201. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text; see also infra Part IV.A.1
(discussing whether officials have sovereign immunity from suits under the Alien Tort
Statute).
202. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
203. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
204. 542 U.S. 692 (2004); see also supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
205. Id. at 732.
206. Id. at 728 (citing the TVPA as providing a "clear mandate" to federal courts from
Congress to adjudicate claims of torture); id. at 732 (citing with apparent approval the holding
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means that the ATS may support some claims for U.S.-sanctioned torture.2°7
However, ATS claims cannot be asserted against the United States or against
U.S. officials for conduct within the scope of their employment. Those
claims will fail because of a combination of sovereign immunity and the
exclusivity provision of the FTCA. To the extent that the ATS gives aliens a
monetary cause of action for U.S.-sanctioned torture, it does so only for
claims against officials for conduct outside the scope of their employment
and for claims against defendants other than the United States or its officials.
1. Sovereign Immunity as a Bar to ATS Claims
To begin with, aliens cannot use the ATS to assert torture claims directly
against the United States. The ATS does not waive the sovereign immunity
of the United States.2°8
in Fildrtiga v. Pefta-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980), that prohibition on torture was a
sufficiently universal and clearly defined norm of international law to be recognized as a
cause of action under the ATS); id. at 738 n.29 (citing with apparent approval Fildrtiga's
description of prohibition of torture as a "norm of international law"); id. at 762 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (including torture in a "subset" of behavior
that is "universally condemned" by international law and that "universal jurisdiction exists to
prosecute").
207. The plaintiff in Alvarez-Machain initially asserted a claim of torture, but he
dropped that claim by the time his case reached the Supreme Court. id. at 699 (majority
opinion). In the Supreme Court, he alleged only that United States and Mexican officials
violated international law by abducting him from Mexico and bringing him to the United
States for federal prosecution. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, United States v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-458) (noting the decision of the district court to reject
as not credible plaintiff's allegations of torture). The Court held that his allegation of
abduction did not state a claim under the ATS because it did not establish a violation of a
clearly defined norm of international law. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 733-34. The Court's
discussion of torture was therefore arguably dicta. Its status as dicta is important because it
leaves open a plausible argument that the ATS does not, after all, provide a broad cause of
action for torture claims. In fact, the Seventh Circuit recently held that the later-enacted TVPA
partially supersedes the ATS. See Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 886 (7th Cir. 2005)
(holding that plaintiffs could not pursue torture claims under the ATS and requiring them
instead to pursue such claims under the TVPA).
208. See, e.g., Industria Panificadora, S.A. v. United States, 957 F.2d 886, 887 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (dismissing on sovereign immunity grounds ATS claims against the United States
asserted by Panamanian businesses based on the failure of the United States to prevent
property damage caused by rioting and looting after its invasion of Panama); Goldstar
(Panama), S.A. v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 967-69 (4th Cir. 1992) (same); Canadian
Transp. Co. v. United States, 663 F.2d 1081, 1091-92 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (dismissing on
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The D.C. Circuit has held that sovereign immunity bars not only ATS
claims against the United States, but also ATS claims against U.S. officials.
The D.C. Circuit held in Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan that sovereign
immunity barred ATS claims against U.S. officials who had armed the
Nicaraguan Contras.20 9 Then-Judge Scalia wrote the opinion for the court
dismissing the claims on sovereign immunity grounds. The court construed
the ATS to allow suits against U.S. officials only "in their official, as
opposed to their personal, capacities-i.e., to the extent that [plaintiffs] are
seeking to hold them to account for, or to prevent them from implementing
in the future, actions of the United States. '2 0 The court concluded that
official capacity suits under the ATS must be barred by sovereign immunity,
even though they are brought against officials, rather than against the United
211States. In the court's view, "[i]t would make a mockery of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity if federal courts were authorized to sanction or enjoin,
by judgments nominally against present or former Executive officers, actions
that are, concededly and as a jurisdictional necessity, official actions of the
United States. 21 2 The D.C. Circuit's view, in sum, was that the ATS allows
suits against U.S. officials only in their official capacities and that official
capacity suits are invariably barred by sovereign immunity. On this view, the
ATS is useless for suing U.S. officials.
Sanchez-Espinoza may no longer be good law in its definition of official
capacity suits. In the later case of Hafer v. Melo, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that sovereign immunity does not bar a suit against an official for
official conduct when the suit seeks money damages out of the official's own
213pocket. The Court explained that, when a suit seeks to hold an official
personally liable in money damages, the suit is brought against the official in
the official's "personal capacity," even if the suit is based on official
conduct.214 Sovereign immunity does not bar these personal capacity suits; it
bars only "official capacity" suits, in which the plaintiff seeks money from
sovereign immunity grounds an ATS claim for the Coast Guard's refusal to allow a vessel
with a Polish master and officers to enter the port of Norfolk, Virginia).
209. 770 F.2d 202, 204, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
210. Id. at 207.
211. Id.
212. Id. (emphasis omitted).
213. 502U.S. 21, 25-27 (1991).
214. Id. at 25 ("Personal-capacity suits ... seek to impose individual liability upon a
government officer for actions taken under color of state law.").
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government coffers or equitable relief affecting government operations. 215
Although Hafer concerns the applicability of sovereign immunity to suits
against state officials, its reasoning probably applies to cases that, like
Sanchez-Espinoza, involve the applicability of the sovereign immunity to
suits against federal officials. 21 6 If so, the plaintiffs in Sanchez-Espinoza
were bringing individual capacity claims under the ATS to the extent that
they sought damages out of the defendant officials' own pockets.217 Under
Hafer, sovereign immunity did not bar those claims, and Sanchez-Espinoza
was therefore wrongly decided.218
In light of Hafer v. Melo and notwithstanding Sanchez-Espinoza,
sovereign immunity probably will not prevent the alien torture victims in our
215. Id. at 27; see Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 (1947) (stating that a suit "is one
against the sovereign" when the judgment sought "would expend itself on the public treasury
or domain, or interfere with the public administration").
216. The Court often applies precedent involving the immunities of states and their
officials to cases involving the immunities of the United States and its officials, and vice
versa. See, e.g., Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 451 (2004) (relying on
a case involving the sovereign immunity of the United States, The Davis, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.)
15 (1869), in a case involving state sovereign immunity); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 749-
50 (1999) (relying on the immunity of the United States from private civil actions in federal
courts to justify holding that states are immune from private civil action in their respective
state courts); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 500 (1978) (stating that, "in the absence of
congressional direction to the contrary," federal officials should have no greater immunity
from liability for constitutional torts than state officials have); see also Richard H. Seamon,
Separation of Powers and the Separate Treatment of Contract Claims Against the Federal
Government for Specific Performance, 43 VILL. L. REv. 155, 173-74 & n.91 (1998) (providing
additional cases); Richard H. Seamon, The Asymmetry of State Sovereign Immunity, 76 WASH.
L. REv. 1067, 1090 & n.115 (2001).
217. See Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 205 & n.1, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(stating that plaintiffs sued most of the official defendants in both their individual and their
official capacities, but treating all monetary claims under the ATS as "official capacity"
claims).
218. See Jama v. INS, 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 365 (D.N.J. 1998) (citing Hafer, and
rejecting defendants' reliance on Sanchez-Espinoza in holding that sovereign immunity did
not bar ATS claims against Immigration and Naturalization Service officials in their
individual capacity), aff'd sub nom. DaSilva v. Esmor Corr. Servs., Inc., Nos. 03-3095, 03-
4435, 03-3096, 03-3348, 05-4007, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 2182 (3d Cir. Jan. 27, 2006); cf Al
Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Randolph, J., concurring)
(citing Sanchez-Espinoza, among other cases, to support the conclusion that sovereign
immunity barred non-monetary claims brought under the ATS by Guantinamo detainees




scenarios, Ghuljaan and Sami, from suing U.S. officials under the ATS
seeking money damages out of those officials' pockets. Another possible
obstacle confronts them, however: the exclusivity provision of the FTCA.
2. The FTCA's Exclusivity Provision as a Bar to ATS Claims
The FTCA generally authorizes people to sue the United States for
money damages arising from the "negligent or wrongful act or omission of
any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his [or
her] office or employment., 21 9 In addition to creating this remedy against the
United States, however, the FTCA generally bars remedies against individual
government employees for the same conduct. The FrCA states as a general
rule:
The remedy against the United States provided by sections 1346(b) and 2672
of this title for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death arising
or resulting from the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee
of the Government while acting within the scope of his [or her] office or
employment is exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding for money
damages by reason of the same subject matter against the employee whose
act or omission gave rise to the claim or against the estate of such
employee.
220
This provision creates a general rule under which, if it is possible for a
person to sue the United States under the FTCA for a federal employee's
misconduct, that person cannot sue the employee for that same misconduct;
claims against the employee are generally excluded. This general rule of
exclusivity is subject to two exceptions. It "does not extend or apply" to "a
civil action against an employee of the Government-(A) which is brought
for a violation of the Constitution of the United States; or (B) which is
brought for a violation of a statute of the United States under which such
action against an individual is otherwise authorized., 22' These exceptions
preserve suits against government employees for constitutional violations
and certain statutory violations.
The FTCA's exclusivity provision requires a two-step analysis of any
claim against a federal employee or other person acting under color of
219. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2000); see also id. §§ 2672, 2679(b)(1).
220. Id. § 2679(b)(1).
221. Id. § 2679(b)(2).
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federal law. The first step asks whether the claim falls within the general rule
of exclusivity. If not, then the claim is not barred by that rule. On the other
hand, if a claim does fall within the general rule of exclusivity, then the
claim will be barred unless a court determines, at the second step, that the
claim is preserved by either the constitutional or statutory exception to the
general rule of exclusivity. These two steps become clearer when they are
applied to the claims of Ghuljaan and Sami, the two alien plaintiffs in our
scenarios.
Both Ghuljaan's claim against the GTMO interrogators and Sami's
claims against the CIA officials who arrange his rendition to Syria fall within
the FTCA's general rule of exclusivity. The FTCA's exclusivity provision
generally bars a claim for (1) a negligent or wrongful act or omission; (2) by
a government employee; (3) acting "within the scope of [the employee's]
office or employment. 222 We have assumed that the official conduct in all of
the scenarios is "wrongful. 223 All of the U.S. officials are government
employees. 224 Finally, the GTMO interrogators and the CIA officials acted
within the scope of their employment when they tortured Ghuljaan and
arranged for Sami's extradition.225 Thus, the FTCA's general rule of
exclusivity will bar Ghuljaan's and Sami's ATS claims against the U.S.
officials unless the claims fall within one or both of the exceptions to the
general rule of exclusivity.
The ATS claims do not fall within either exception. The ATS authorizes
suits "for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States. 226 Thus, ATS suits are for violations of international
law or U.S. treaties, not for violations of the Constitution. They therefore do
not fall within the exception for an action "brought for a violation of the
Constitution of the United States. 227 Nor is an ATS claim "brought for a
violation of a statute of the United States. 228 Although the ATS is a statute,
an ATS claim does not assert any violation of that or any other federal
statute; instead, an ATS claim must assert a violation of international law or
a treaty. z29 Because the ATS does not itself independently proscribe any
222. Id. § 2679(b)(1).
223. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
224. See supra Part III.A. 1.
225. See supra Part III.A.2.
226. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
227. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A).
228. Id. § 2679(b)(2)(B).
229. See id. § 1350.
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conduct, courts have held that ATS actions do not fall within the exception
for statutory violations. 3° Since Ghuljaan's and Sami's ATS claims do not
fall within either exception, they are barred by the FTCA's general rule of
exclusivity.
231
Although their ATS claims against U.S. officials are barred, Ghuljaan
and Sami can state a cause of action for their torture against the United States
under the FTCA. After all, their injuries stem from the
wrongful act ... of ... employee[s] of the Government while acting within
the scope of [their] office or employment, under circumstances where[,
Ghuljaan and Sami would claim,] the United States, if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred.
2 32
It might therefore seem like the FTCA's rule of exclusivity just forces a
tradeoff: although it prevents a torture victim from suing the individual
officer under the ATS, the victim can sue the United States under the FTCA.
But the tradeoff is largely illusory. Most torture victims who can state claims
230. See Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 631-32 (9th Cir. 2003) (en
banc) (adopting the vacated panel's decision that exception to the FTCA's exclusivity
provision for certain statutory violations did not apply to the ATS claim), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); Jama v. INS, 343 F. Supp.
2d 338, 355 (D.N.J. 2004) (holding that ATS suits do not fall within the exception to the
FTCA exclusivity provision for suits alleging statutory violations), affd sub nom. DaSilva v.
Esmor Corr. Servs., Inc., Nos. 03-3095, 03-4435, 03-3096, 03-3348, 05-4007, 2006 U.S. App.
LEXIS 2182 (3d Cir. Jan. 27, 2006; Schneider v. Kissinger, 310 F. Supp. 2d 251, 266-67
(D.D.C. 2004) (same); see also Adras v. Nelson, 917 F.2d 1552, 1553, 1557 & n.4 (11th Cir.
1990) (citing the FTCA's exclusivity provision in a case in which aliens originally asserted
ATS claims but later conceded that their claims against federal officials were based solely on
the FTCA and the doctrine of Bivens).
231. A report on the extraordinary rendition of suspected terrorists states that U.S.
officials involved in extraordinary rendition might be liable under the ATS. See Torture by
Proxy, supra note 12, at 120-21 (referring to the ATS as the "Alien Tort Claims Act" or
"ATCA"). The report fails to recognize that ATS claims are barred by the FTCA's exclusivity
provision, as does a recent essay and a comment on ATS claims against the United States and
its officials. See generally Julian G. Ku, The Third Wave: The Alien Tort Statute and the War
on Terrorism, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 105 (2005) (discussing ATS claims arising from U.S.
detentions in the war against terrorism without mentioning the FTCA's exclusivity provision);
Borrowman, supra note 12, at 374, 399-400 (arguing that the ATS "should provide a remedy
against the individual soldiers... who participated in the abuse" at Abu Ghraib).
232. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).
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cognizable under the FTCA will be barred from recovering by one of the
FTCA's exceptions. In particular, Ghuljaan's FTCA claims will be barred by
the foreign country exception; Sami's may be barred in part by the foreign
country exception and in part by the discretionary-function or intentional tort
exception. This illustrates a cruel feature of the FTCA's exclusivity
provision: it bars a claim against a federal employee even when an FTCA
action against the United States for the same conduct is barred by one of the
FTCA's exceptions, such as the intentional torts exception or the foreign
233country exceptions. In other words, the FICA generally provides the
exclusive remedy for official misconduct even when it provides no remedy at
all! As a result, Sami and Ali will not be able to sue the officers responsible
for their torture under the ATS or the United States under the FTCA.
3. Summary
Sovereign immunity combines with the FTCA's exclusivity provision to
bar ATS claims for money damages against the United States and its officials
for torture inflicted within the scope of their employment. To the extent that
the ATS gives aliens a monetary cause of action for torture, it does so only
for claims against (1) federal employees who, in inflicting torture, act outside
the scope of their employment or (2) others who inflict torture with U.S.
connivance, but not as employees of the U.S. government. 234
B. Non-Federal Tort Claims
So far, discussion has assumed that the suits arising from our scenarios
will be brought in federal court and assert federal causes of action. Now we
examine that assumption. Suppose, for example, that one of the guards who
tortured Ali at Abu Ghraib prison returns to her home in West Virginia and
that Ali tracks her down there. Further suppose Ali sues the former guard in a
West Virginia state court, asserting common law tort claims. This action may
233. See Smith v. United States, 499 U.S. 160, 165-75 (1991) (holding that the
FTCA's exclusivity provision barred a medical malpractice claim against a military doctor
even though an FTCA claim against the United States for the doctor's malpractice was barred
by the FTCA's foreign country exception).
234. The plaintiff in Alvarez-Machain relied on the ATS to sue a Mexican who
participated with U.S. officials in the plaintiffs abduction from Mexico. See Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697 (2004). The Court held that, although the ATS authorizes federal
courts to hear civil actions for some violations of international law, the plaintiff in that case
did not state a cause of action cognizable under the ATS. See id. at 730-38.
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raise difficult choice of law questions, such as whether the suit is governed
by West Virginia's tort law, Iraq's tort law, or that of some other
jurisdiction.235 But assuming that choice can be made, what, if anything,
would bar a non-federal tort claim? The answer is that most, but not all, non-
federal tort claims will be precluded by the FrCA's exclusivity provision,
the same provision that bars most ATS claims against U.S. officials.2 36
The FrCA generally provides the exclusive remedy "for injury or loss of
property, or personal injury or death arising or resulting from the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting
within the scope of his [or her] office or employment. ' '237 The only
exceptions to this general rule of exclusivity are for claims against the
employee based on violations of the U.S. Constitution and certain statutory
violations. All other claims against a federal employee for wrongful acts
committed within the scope of his or her employment, including claims
based on state or foreign tort law, are excluded.238
The FTCA does not bar non-federal tort claims that are not cognizable
under the FTCA. For example, to be cognizable under the FTCA, a claim
must be based on conduct of a government employee acting within the scope
of his or her employment.239 Thus, the FTFCA does not bar claims against a
federal employee for conduct outside the scope of his or her employment.
2 40
235. See generally Steven C. Welsh, Iraq Transition, Interim Constitution, and Human
Rights: Legal Standards Governing Treatment of Iraqi Detainees by Iraqi Security Forces
During U.S. Occupation, CENTER FOR DEF. INFO., Jan. 31, 2005, http://www.cdi.org/
news/law/iraq-law-detainees.cfm (discussing law governing the treatment of detainees in
Iraq).
236. See supra notes 219-33 and accompanying text.
237. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1).
238. See, e.g., Salmon v. Schwarz, 948 F.2d 1131, 1141 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that
the FICA precluded state tort claims against FBI agents); Willis v. Skaff, 414 S.E.2d 450, 452
(W. Va. 1992) (holding that the FTCA preempted a state-court suit under state law by a
National Guard member for injuries suffered when he was struck by a National Guard
vehicle); cf. Matsushita Elec. Co. v. Zeigler, 158 F.3d 1167, 1169-70 (1lth Cir. 1998)
(holding that the FICA's exclusivity provision eliminated a federal common law negligence
claim against a customs inspector who damaged equipment during an inspection).
239. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
240. See Brennan v. Fatata, 359 N.Y.S.2d 91, 92 (1974) ("It is implicit [in the FTCA]
that... if the Attorney General does not certify [that the defendants' challenged conduct was]
in the scope of federal employment, the state action continues against the defendants
personally."); H.R. REP. No. 100-700, at 6 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5945, 5950
("The 'exclusive remedy' provision [enacted as 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)] is intended to substitute
the United States as the solely permissible defendant in all common law tort actions against
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Therefore, the Abu Ghraib guard who returns to West Virginia can be sued
in a state court there on non-federal tort grounds if, as may be the case, she
was acting outside the scope of employment when she tortured Ali.241 In that
event, the guard's conduct is not cognizable under the FTCA. Accordingly,
the FrCA's exclusivity provision does not bar an action against her based on
that conduct.
In addition to conduct by a federal employee outside the scope of
employment, another type of conduct that is not cognizable under the FICA
is conduct by people who are not "employee[s] of the government" within
the meaning of the FTCA.242 The Syrian officials who torture Sami in the
Syrian rendition scenario are probably not "employee[s] of the
government. 2 43 This means that Sami cannot sue the United States for their
conduct under the FICA. Because Sami's claim against the Syrian officials
is not cognizable under the FTCA, the FTCA's exclusivity provision will not
bar Sami from suing those officials. A separate question is whether Sami can
find a viable legal theory for suing the Syrian officials; in any event, his
claim against them will not be barred by the FrCA's exclusivity provision.
244
Federal employees who acted in the scope of employment." (emphasis added)), quoted in
Smith v. United States, 499 U.S. 160, 167 n.9 (1991); see also Kassaw v. Minor, 717 So. 2d
382, 384-85 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998) (refusing to dismiss a state-court tort action against a
student who was paid by federal work-study funds to clean a community college's physics
department because receipt of federal work-study funds did not make the student a federal
employee); Garabedian v. Skochko, 283 Cal. Rptr. 802, 806 (Ct. App. 1991) (permitting a real
estate agent to bring a state court action for a state law tort against the manager of property
owned by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development after the federal court
determined that the manager was not a federal employee); AccuBanc Mortgage Co. v.
Drummonds, 938 S.W.2d 135, 140-41 (Tex. App. 1996) (permitting a former officer of a
mortgage banking company to sue the company in state court for state law claims arising from
his firing because the board of directors of the company had dual role as employees of a
federal entity, the Resolution Trust Corporation, and as employees of a private company).
241. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
242. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2000). See generally supra notes 45-56 and accompanying
text.
243. See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
244. Sami may have a cause of action against the Syrian officials under the TVPA.
The TVPA states in relevant part: "An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or
color of law, of any foreign nation. . . subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action,
be liable for damages to that individual." Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2(a), 106 Stat. 73, 73 (1992)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2000)). Although the TVPA may create a cause of action,
Sami may have trouble finding a U.S. court that can assert personal jurisdiction over the
Syrian officials who tortured him. See, e.g., In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept., 11, 2001, 349 F.
Supp. 2d. 765, 812-18, 820-21 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction
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Although the FTCA's exclusivity provision will not bar a non-federal
tort claim by Sami against the Syrian officials who tortured him, the FTCA's
exclusivity provision does bar his claims against the U.S. officials who
handed him over to the Syrian official, and it also bars non-federal tort
claims against the U.S. officials involved in the GTMO scenario. The U.S.
officials in both scenarios are government employees and were acting within
the scope of their employment. 245 Non-federal tort claims against them are
therefore cognizable under the FTCA and barred by its exclusivity provision.
In sum, non-federal tort law may create a civil remedy against officials
for U.S.-sanctioned torture if the torture is not cognizable in an FTCA claim
against the United States. As a practical matter, this means that claims based
on non-federal tort law, like claims based on the ATS, may lie against (1)
federal employees who, in inflicting torture, act outside the scope of their
employment and (2) others who inflict torture with U.S. connivance, but not
as employees of the U.S. government.
C. Constitutional Tort Claims
The FTCA's exclusivity provision will bar most torture claims against
U.S. officials predicated on the Alien Tort Statute or non-federal tort law.
Indeed, the FTCA's exclusivity provision preserves only one basis for most
torture claims against U.S. officials-actions "brought for a violation of the
Constitution of the United States. 246 This allows "constitutional tort" claims
against federal employees.247
claims under the TVPA and other statutes against several defendants allegedly involved in the
9/11 attacks). A second obstacle to a TVPA suit against the Syrian officials is that some courts
have held that foreign officials can claim foreign sovereign immunity from TVPA actions. See
Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1101-06 (9th Cir. 1990) (discussing case
law and holding that an individual defendant had foreign sovereign immunity from claims
asserted in that case). But see Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 881-82 (7th Cir. 2005)
(holding that an individual defendant could not claim foreign sovereign immunity).
245. See supra text accompanying notes 45-48, 63-67.
246. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A).
247. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19-20 (1980) (discussing the purpose of
the provision in the FrCA's exclusivity provision that allows claims for constitutional
violations); H.R. REP. No. 100-700, at 6 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5945, 5950
("IT]he courts have identified [constitutional torts] as a more serious intrusion of the rights of
an individual that merits special attention. Consequently, [the proposed legislation generally
making the FTCA remedy exclusive] would not affect the ability of victims of constitutional




The legal basis for constitutional tort claims against federal officials is
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Narcotics Agents. 248 In Bivens, the
Court recognized a federal cause of action for money damages against the
federal agents who violated the plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights.249 In
later cases, the Court recognized Bivens claims for violations of the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause 2 0 and the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause.2 5 1 The Court has made clear, however, that it
will not recognize Bivens claims for all constitutional violations in all
circumstances. To the contrary, the Court in Bivens held that a constitutional
tort claim "may be defeated ...in two situations. 252 The first is "when
defendants demonstrate special factors counselling hesitation in the absence
of affirmative action by Congress., 253 The second is "when defendants show
that Congress has provided an alternative remedy which it explicitly declared
to be a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as
equally effective. 254 In short, the predicate for a constitutional tort claim
under Bivens is a constitutional violation; however, even if a constitutional
violation exists, a court may not recognize a Bivens action for one of the two
reasons articulated in Bivens.
The torture victims in our scenarios may have trouble identifying a
constitutional violation and avoiding the "special factors" limitation on the
Bivens cause of action.
1. Constitutional Violations
Torture potentially violates the same constitutional provisions for which
the Court has recognized Bivens claims: the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause, and the Eighth Amendment Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause. Torture could violate the Fourth Amendment if
248. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
249. See id. at 391-97.
250. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 234-49 (1979) (recognizing a cause of
action for an alleged violation the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment
brought against a former member of Congress who, while in Congress, fired plaintiff from his
staff because she was a woman).
251. See Carlson, 446 U.S. at 16-24 (recognizing a cause of action against federal
prison officials for their deliberate indifference to decedent's serious medical needs while in
prison).
252. Id. at 18 (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396).
253. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396).
254. Id. at 18-19 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397).
[Vol. 37:715774
U.S. TORTURE ASA TORT
it constituted "excessive force" and were used by government agents in
connection with detention or interrogation of detainees.255 Torture could
violate the substantive component of the Due Process Clause if it "shocked
the conscience" and were used in situations not governed by the Fourth
Amendment's ban on excessive force or the Eighth Amendment's ban on
cruel and unusual punishment. 256 Finally, torture could violate the Eighth
Amendment if it were "cruel and unusual" and inflicted as part of an official
punishment.
257
These constitutional provisions have limits, however, that may prevent
them from applying in some of our scenarios. The Court has held that the
Fourth Amendment does not apply to the search and seizure of property that
belongs to a non-resident alien and is located in a foreign country.258 The
Court based that holding on reasoning that could prevent aliens from relying
on the Fourth Amendment to assert claims of excessive force based on
255. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389-90 (noting plaintiff's allegations that agents violated
the Fourth Amendment through an unwarranted search, an arrest without probable cause, and
the use of excessive force to make the search and arrest); see also Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989) (holding that the Fourth Amendment, rather than substantive due
process, governs claims that law enforcement officials used excessive force during an arrest or
other seizure of a person).
256. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841-48 (1998) (holding that
substantive due process, rather than the Fourth Amendment, governed a claim arising from a
high-speed police pursuit of suspects that ended in death); see also Chavez v. Martinez, 538
U.S. 760, 774 (2003) (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Scalia, J.) (reviewing
challenged police conduct under the "shocks the conscience" standard of substantive due
process case law); id. at 796 (Kennedy J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[I]t
seems to me a simple enough matter to say that use of torture or its equivalent in an attempt to
induce a statement violates an individual's fundamental right to liberty of the person.").
257. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1879) ("[I]t is safe to affirm that
punishments of torture... and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden
by [the Eighth Amendment]."), quoted in Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). The
Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment would not apply directly to a
detainee until the detainee has been convicted or, perhaps, otherwise adjudicated to be
deserving of punishment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 n.16 (1979) (holding that
conditions for holding pretrial detainees were properly analyzed under the Due Process Clause
rather than the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, because "'Eighth
Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the State has complied with the constitutional
guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions"' (quoting Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 651, 671-72 n.40 (1977))).
258. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264-75 (1990).
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official conduct that occurs outside the United States.25 9 In addition to
limiting the Fourth Amendment, the Court has held that the Fifth
Amendment "does not confer a right of personal security" upon certain
"enemy aliens. '2 ° More broadly, the Court has said in dicta, "Neither the
Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign
territory unless in respect of our own citizens., 261 The dicta would foreclose
claims under the Eighth Amendment as well as those under the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments. In general, the Court has refused to extend constitutional
262protection to aliens overseas.
This refusal could defeat some constitutional tort claims in the GTMO
scenario, which involves an Afghan citizen captured in Afghanistan and
detained on a U.S. naval base in Cuba. Ghuljaan's situation resembles that of
the German "enemy aliens" who were captured, tried, and imprisoned
outside the United States and to whom the Court denied Fifth Amendment
protection in Johnson v. Eisentrager.263 Ghuljaan can distinguish his
situation using several arguments, however, including the argument that
GTMO is not outside the United States. 264 Ghuljaan will certainly have to do
so to recover from his captors under the constitutional tort doctrine of Bivens.
259. See id. at 264-75 (finding evidence that the term "people" in the Fourth
Amendment does not include aliens without a substantial connection to the United States).
260. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 785 (1950); see also Verdugo-Urquidez,
494 U.S. at 269 (describing Eisentrager as "reject[ing] the claim that aliens are entitled to
Fifth Amendment rights outside the sovereign territory of the United States").
261. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936). This
dicta may have been undermined by later federal statutes that expressly apply outside the
United States, including, apparently, to non-citizens. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at
1068-69 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also 1 VED P. NANDA & DAvID K. PANSIES, LITIGATION
OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS § 5.3, at 202-03 (2004).
262. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) ("It is well established that
certain constitutional protections available to persons inside the United States are unavailable
to aliens outside of our geographic borders."); see also Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 451
(1998) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[Ilt is unclear whether an alien may assert
constitutional objections when he or she is outside the territory of the United States.").
263. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 777.
264. See In re Guantnamo Detainee Case, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443,453-64 (D.D.C. 2005)
(holding that GuantAnamo detainees have the right to due process); see also Rasul v. Bush 542
U.S. 466, 476 (2004) (holding that the petitioners had a statutory right to bring habeas
challenge and finding that they "differ from the Eisentrager detainees in important respects,"
including being imprisoned at GTMO, which is "territory over which the United States
exercises exclusive jurisdiction and control"); see also supra note 137 (discussing 2004
legislation making an anti-torture statute applicable to GTMO).
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Uncertainty about the extra-territorial reach of the Constitution would
also complicate constitutional tort claims by Sami, the alien torture victim in
the Syrian rendition scenario. U.S. officials arrested Sami in New York. His
presence in the United States gives him a connection to this country that
neither Ghuljaan nor the German soldiers in Eisentrager had.265 It is unclear,
however, whether his presence in the United States, standing alone, gave him
a "substantial" enough connection with the United States to claim
constitutional rights.266
Further complicating Sami's constitutional tort claim under Bivens is that
the torture was inflicted by Syrian officials, not by U.S. officials. In general,
the Constitution does not restrain foreign officials.267 Sami may argue that
Syrian officials should be held to constitutional standards because they were
acting as a cat's paw for U.S. officials.268 In addition, or alternatively, Sami
may argue that U.S. officials violated the Constitution by handing him over
to Syria for torture. 269 Those arguments raise important and highly unsettled
issues that may have to be resolved in litigating constitutional tort claims for
U.S.-sanctioned torture.
2. Special Factors Counseling Hesitation
Related to, but distinct from, the extra-territorial reach of the
Constitution is the extra-territorial reach of the Bivens cause of action. The
Court has said that "Bivens action[s] might be unavailable" to aliens for
265. Cf. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271 (holding that a Mexican citizen did not
have any "substantial connection with" the United States so as to give him Fourth Amendment
rights because, at the time of the challenged search in Mexico, he had been in the United
States only a few days and had been brought into the United States involuntarily).
266. See id. at 271-72 (finding it unnecessary to decide "[t]he extent to which [an
alien] might claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment if the duration of his stay in the
United States were to be prolonged" beyond a few days); cf. Shaughnessy v. United States ex
rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) ("[Alliens who have once passed through our gates, even
illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of
fairness encompassed in due process of law."), quoted in Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693; Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1942) (reviewing the constitutional claims of unlawful combatants
captured on U.S. soil).
267. See, e.g., United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 280 n.9 (2d Cir. 1974).
268. Cf. United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 698-700 (1998) (stating that
cooperation between domestic and foreign officials could become so strong that a person
could invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination based on
fear of potential foreign prosecution).
269. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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constitutional violations in foreign countries. 270 The Court explained that the
foreign location and the identity of the Bivens claimant may be "special
factors counselling hesitation" in recognizing a Bivens claim. 27' The Court
might be particularly reluctant to recognize a Bivens claim when doing so
would require judicial review of the executive branch's conduct of foreign
affairs and military strategy, as may be true of torture claims arising from the
war on terrorism. 272 Another factor arguably counseling hesitation is that
Congress has enacted legislation authorizing private suits by the victims of
official torture, but only when the torture is inflicted under color of a foreign
country's law, and not when it is inflicted under color of U.S. law.273 The
270. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274.
271. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Chappell v. Wallace 462 U.S. 296,
298 (1983)); see also id. at 292 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that extra-territorial
application of the Fourth Amendment would not materially impair America's conduct of
foreign affairs because of the Court's recognition that "there may be certain situations in
which the offensive use of constitutional rights should be limited," and citing the discussion of
"special factors" that would preclude recognition of a Bivens claim).
272. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 279-83 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding
"compelling" the argument that the "special factors" exception barred a Bivens claim by a
torture victim whom defendant United States rendered to Syria for torture); Sanchez-Espinoza
v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 208-09 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (refusing to recognize Bivens claims by
citizens and residents of Nicaragua arising out of U.S. officials' aid to "Contras," and stating
that "the special needs of foreign affairs must stay our hand in the creation of damage
remedies against military and foreign policy officials for allegedly unconstitutional treatment
of foreign subjects causing injury abroad"); see also United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669,
678-84 (1987) (holding that "special factors counselling hesitation" required refusal to
recognize Bivens actions for injuries to members of armed services that "'arise out of or are in
the course of activity incident to service"' (quoting Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146
(1950))); Van Tu v. Koster, 364 F.3d 1196, 1197-98 (10th Cir.) (stating that availability of a
Bivens remedy was "questionable" in an action by representatives of the victims and survivors
of the My Lai Massacre during the Vietnam War), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 874 (2004).
273. The TVPA states: "An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or
color of law, of any foreign nation ... subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action,
be liable for damages to that individual." Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2(a), 106 Stat. 73, 73 (1992)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2000)). The TVPA's legislative history contains no
evidence that, in creating this remedy for foreign torture, Congress intended to foreclose
remedies available to the victims of U.S. torture. Instead, the legislative history indicates that
Congress wanted to extend to U.S. citizens the civil remedy for foreign torture that had
already been determined by some courts to be available to aliens suing under the Alien Tort
Statute. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REc. H11, 244-45 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 1991) (statement of Rep.
Mazzoli) (bill later enacted as the TVPA would "clarif[y] existing law to make explicit that
victims of torture can bring a Federal civil cause of action against their torturer" and would
"expand[] existing law by providing U.S. citizens the right to obtain civil redress for torture");
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possibility that the Court would refuse to allow Bivens claims by alien
victims of U.S. torture is all the more likely considering the Court's general
disinclination in the last twenty-five years to extend Bivens 4
3. Application of Limits on Constitutional Rights and on the Bivens
Remedy to Torture Scenarios
The potential limits on constitutional rights and on the Bivens cause of
action are most likely to prevent claims arising from the GTMO scenario,
because the GTMO scenario involves an alien victim of torture that,
depending on GTMO's status, may be found to have occurred on foreign
soil.27 5 As for the Abu Ghraib scenario, Ali's status as a U.S. citizen may
entitle him to the full measure of constitutional rights.276 The tough question
in his case will be whether a Bivens remedy is available for violations of
those rights, given the context of a foreign military operation in which the
277violations occurred. Finally, in the Syrian rendition scenario, Sami, though
an alien, probably can assert a Bivens action against the CIA officials and
other officials involved in his arrest in New York and his rendition to
S. REP. No. 102-249, at 5 (1991) ("[W]hile the Alien Tort Claims Act provides a remedy to
aliens only, the TVPA would extend a civil remedy also to U.S. citizens who may have been
tortured abroad."). Without evidence that Congress intended to limit other remedies, the
TVPA's creation of a civil remedy for foreign torture probably should not weigh against
recognizing a Bivens remedy for U.S. torture. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 247 (1979)
(holding that Congress's exclusion of congressional employees from a statute authorizing
federal employees to sue the federal government for employment discrimination did not weigh
against allowing congressional employees to sue under Bivens); cf. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487
U.S. 412, 421-29 (1988) (holding that a Bivens remedy was not available for due process
violations by officials administering a disability benefits program under title II of the Social
Security Act, and finding the existence of meaningful statutory remedies against the United
States for improper disability determinations was a "special factor counselling hesitation" in
recognition of a Bivens remedy).
274. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001) ("Since [Carlson v.
Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980)] we have consistently refused to extend Bivens liability to any new
context or new category of defendants.").
275. See Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 209; see also Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d
596, 602-04 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that the Fifth Amendment did not protect a Guatemalan
citizen allegedly tortured and killed by the Guatemalan military at the instance of the CIA),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002).
276. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957) (plurality opinion) ("[W]e reject the idea
that when the United States acts against citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of
Rights.").
277. See supra notes 270-73 and accompanying text.
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Syria.278 Even while on U.S. soil, however, his constitutional rights may be
watered down compared to those of a U.S. citizen. 279 Furthermore, Sami's
constitutional rights, as well as the availability of a Bivens remedy, may end
altogether when he left U.S. hands and the U.S. shore.
D. Official Immunity
So far, the discussion of civil remedies against U.S. officials for torture
has concluded that Bivens provides the only potentially viable cause of action
for most claims. A successful Bivens claim depends on the torture victim
establishing a constitutional violation, and, even if the victim proves such a
violation, the court still may not allow a Bivens remedy because of "special
factors counselling hesitation.,, 280 Beyond the hurdles of establishing a
constitutional violation and the availability of a Bivens remedy for that
violation, there lies a third hurdle: most officials sued under Bivens for
unconstitutional torture will have qualified immunity.
1. Official Immunity in General
Whereas sovereign immunity can bar suits naming the government as a
defendant, official immunity can bar suits that name government officials as
defendants and seek money damages out of the officials' own pockets.
Official immunity takes two forms: absolute immunity and qualified
immunity.281 Absolute immunity protects an official from suit regardless of
278. See Humphries v. Various Fed. U.S. INS Employees, 164 F.3d 936, 948 (5th Cir.
1999) ("In general, . . .a United States district court may consider the merits of a Bivens
action for money damages, asserted by a nonresident alien who is present in this country,
against federal government officials." (citation omitted)).
279. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950) ("The alien, to whom the
United States has been traditionally hospitable, has been accorded a generous and ascending
scale of rights as he increases his identity with our society .... [T]hey become more extensive
and secure when he makes preliminary declaration of intention to become a citizen, and they
expand to those of full citizenship upon naturalization."); cf Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510,
543-47 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring) (explaining that rights of lawful permanent resident
aliens approach those of full citizenship).
280. E.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980).
281. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268-69 (1993) (discussing both forms
of official immunity); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223-24 (1988) (same).
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how malicious and illegal the official's conduct might be.282 Qualified
immunity is narrower. The officials involved in our scenarios could claim
only qualified immunity from Bivens claims.283
The leading modem case on qualified immunity is Harlow v.
Fitzgerald.284 The Court in Harlow described qualified immunity as follows:
"[O]fficials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known. 285 Harlow's objective, "reasonable person" standard
replaced the Court's earlier standard, which conditioned immunity on both
the objective reasonableness of an official's conduct and the subjective good
faith of the official.286
As described in Harlow, qualified immunity has two elements. One
concerns the official conduct on which the lawsuit is based; the other
concerns the right that the official has supposedly violated. The conduct must
involve an official's exercise of a "discretionary function," as distinguished
from a "ministerial task., 287 This discretionary function element limits
immunity to government decision-making that is not cut-and-dried and
therefore could be distorted by the fear of litigation and liability.288 The
282. See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359-64 (1978) (holding that a judge
had absolute immunity from action challenging his order, which authorized the sterilization of
a fifteen-year-old girl without her knowledge based on the ex parte application of her parents).
283. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978) ("[Q]ualified immunity from
damages liability should be the general rule for executive officials charged with constitutional
violations....").
284. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
285. Id. at 818.
286. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987) ("[Harlow] completely
reformulated qualified immunity along principles not at all embodied in the common law,
replacing the inquiry into subjective malice so frequently required at common law with an
objective inquiry into the legal reasonableness of the official action.").
287. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816 (stating that "[i]mmunity generally is available only to
officials performing discretionary functions," as distinguished from "'ministerial' tasks").
288. See id. at 814 (noting that suits against officials create "the danger that fear of
being sued will dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public
officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties" (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949))); see
also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 284 (1993) (referring to the "distortive effects of
potential liability" in discussing justification for absolute official immunity); Westfall v.
Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 297 (1988) (stating, in regard to absolute official immunity: "It is only
when officials exercise decisionmaking discretion that potential liability may shackle the
20061
RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL
second element of the Harlow standard requires that the right supposedly
violated by the defendant official must be a "clearly established" right of
which a reasonable person would have known.289 This second, "clearly
established" element ensures that "the officer had fair notice that her conduct
was unlawful. 29 °
a. The "Discretionary Function" Element of the Harlow Test
The Supreme Court still mentions the first element of the Harlow
standard, stating that qualified immunity protects only "government officials
performing discretionary functions. 29' Even so, since Harlow, the
"discretionary function" element has almost never restricted the scope of
fearless, vigorous, and effective administration of policies of government." (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959))).
289. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
290. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004); see also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S.
730, 739 (2002) ("[Q]ualified immunity operates 'to ensure that before they are subjected to
suit, officers are on notice their conduct is unlawful."' (quoting Saucier v, Katz. 533 U.S. 194,
206 (2001))). In the newly enacted Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Congress has included
the following immunity provision:
In any civil action or criminal prosecution against an officer, employee, member
of the Armed Forces, or other agent of the United States Government who is a United
States person, arising out of the officer, employee, member of the Armed Forces, or
other agent's engaging in specific operational practices, that involve detention and
interrogation of aliens who the President or his designees have determined are
believed to be engaged in or associated with international terrorist activity that poses
a serious, continuing threat to the United States, its interests, or its allies, and that
were officially authorized and determined to be lawful at the time that they were
conducted, it shall be a defense that such officer, employee, member of the Armed
Forces, or other agent did not know that the practices were unlawful and a person of
ordinary sense and understanding would not know the practices were unlawful. Good
faith reliance on advice of counsel should be an important factor, among others, to
consider in assessing whether a person of ordinary sense and understanding would
have known the practices to be unlawful. Nothing in this section shall be construed to
limit or extinguish any defense or protection otherwise available to any person or
entity from suit, civil or criminal liability, or damages, or to provide immunity from
prosecution for any criminal offense by the proper authorities.
Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1004(a), 119 Stat. 2680, 2740 (Dec. 30, 2005). This immunity
provision appears generally to be narrower than the immunity conferred by Harlow. It
therefore may not significantly affect the analysis offered in this section of the Article.
291. E.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at
818).
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qualified immunity.292 Perhaps this is partly because the Court has not
required, as a precondition of qualified immunity, that discretionary
decisions be susceptible to considerations of public policy. 293 In this respect,
the discretionary function element of the Harlow standard is easier for
official conduct to satisfy than it is for official conduct to satisfy the
discretionary function exception to the FTCA.294 Official conduct satisfies
the discretionary function element of Harlow if it involves any choice and is
not purely "ministerial.9
295
In addition, the Court interpreted the discretionary-ministerial distinction
in Davis v. Scherer296 so that it precludes immunity in only a subset of cases
involving ministerial acts. Under Davis, the discretionary function element of
Harlow precludes immunity only when a statute or other binding law
prescribes a precise course of conduct for an official.2 97 Furthermore, an
292. See, e.g., Sellers v. Baer, 28 F.3d 895, 902 (8th Cir. 1994) ("[W]e note our belief
that the ministerial-duty exception to the qualified immunity defense is dead letter.");
McIntosh v. Weinberger, 810 F.2d 1411, 1432 (8th Cir. 1987) ("[T]he plaintiffs have cited,
and we can find, no recent case other than that before us in which a court has rejected
qualified immunity simply because the official in question was performing a ministerial
duty."); see also Varrone v. Bilotti, 123 F.3d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 1997) ("The continued validity of
the ministerial-discretionary function distinction in determining qualified immunity has been
questioned."); Horta v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 2, 11 (1st Cir. 1993) ("[I]n spite of [Harlow's]
reference to discretionary functions, it has never since been clear exactly what role, if any, this
concept is supposed to play in applying qualified immunity."); cf. Harbert Int'l, Inc. v. James,
157 F.3d 1271, 1281-84 (1lth Cir. 1998) (stating that qualified immunity is not available
"[w]hen a government official goes completely outside the scope of his discretionary
authority"; for in that situation "he ceases to act as a government official and instead acts on
his own behalf'); In re Allen 106 F.3d 582, 593-98 (4th Cir. 1997) (declaring that the
"discretionary function" limitation of the qualified immunity doctrine prevents the defense of
qualified immunity by an official who acts "totally beyond the scope of his authority," and
finding that, because of that limitation, defendant official could not claim qualified immunity).
293. See, e.g., Horta, 4 F.3d at 12 (concluding that the defendant officer's conduct was
discretionary because police guidelines for high-speed pursuits required interpretation).
294. See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
295. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982) (stating that "[i]mmunity
generally is available only to officials performing discretionary functions," as distinguished
from "'ministerial' tasks").
296. 468 U.S. 183 (1984).
297. Id. at 196 n.14; see, e.g., Eddy v. V.I. Water & Power Auth., 256 F.3d 204, 210-
11 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding that the supposed personnel policy of compelling employees to
work under unsafe conditions did not prescribe the precise course of conduct for defendant
officials, whose conduct was therefore discretionary for qualified immunity purposes); Trotter
v. Watkins, 869 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding that officials' conduct was
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official can have qualified immunity even for conduct that violates a statute
or other binding law, unless that violation itself is the basis for the Bivens
claim.
298
Because of its importance to analysis of torture claims, the Davis case
deserves some description. In Davis, a former employee of state government
sued the official who fired him, alleging that the firing violated the Due
Process Clause.299 The former employee argued that the official was not
exercising a discretionary function, and therefore could not claim qualified
immunity, because he violated procedural regulations when he fired the
plaintiff.3°° The Court found two flaws in this argument. First, plaintiff was
suing for a due process violation, not a regulatory violation.30 ' The Court
explained that "breach of a legal duty created by the personnel regulation
would forfeit official immunity only if that breach itself gave rise to the
[plaintiff's] cause of action for damages. ' 3 °2 Second, the regulations were not
detailed enough to make the defendant official's conduct nondiscretionary.
The Court noted, "A law that fails to specify the precise action that the
official must take in each instance creates only discretionary authority; and
that authority remains discretionary however egregiously it is abused.
30 3
Because under Davis the discretionary function element of the Harlow
standard does not much limit the availability of a qualified immunity
discretionary because "[n]o law or regulation precisely specifie[d]" how they were to act in
the situation that gave rise to plaintiffs claim).
298. Davis, 468 U.S. at 196 n.14; Sellers v. Baer, 28 F.3d 895, 902 (8th Cir. 1994)
(holding that defendant officials' conduct was discretionary, even if it violated regulations
governing the handling of unruly fair-goers, because plaintiffs did not base their claim on a
regulatory violation); Horta, 4 F.3d at 12 (concluding that official's conduct was
discretionary, even if it violated police guidelines for high-speed chases, because plaintiff's
claim was based on the Fourth Amendment, not on breach of the guidelines); Gagne v. City of
Galveston, 805 F.2d 558, 559-60 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding a police officer's conduct was
discretionary, even if it violated a department rule requiring the removal of an arrestee's belt
before being put in jail, because plaintiffs claim, which arose from the arrestee's suicide
using the belt, was not based on a violation of the department rule, but on the Constitution).
299. See Davis, 468 U.S. at 185-87.
300. See id. at 196 n.14.
301. See id. at 187. The plaintiff in Davis sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000), which
creates a cause of action against state officials who violate the plaintiffs' federal rights. See id.
The plaintiff could not use the defendant's violation of his rights under the personnel
regulation as a basis for a § 1983 claim because the personnel regulation was a provision of
state law, not federal law. See id. at 188, 189 n.6.
302. Id. at 196 n.14.
303. Id.
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defense, most case law focuses on the second element, which requires a court
to determine whether a defendant's conduct violates "clearly established"




b. The "Clearly Established" Element of the Harlow Test
If a defendant's conduct violates "clearly established" rights of which a
reasonable person would have known, the official does not have immunity
from personal liability for the conduct. Under this second, "clearly
established" element, a federal court initially must decide whether the
official conduct challenged as a constitutional tort violates the plaintiff's
constitutional rights at all.305 If so, the court must then decide if those rights
are clearly established. The latter step requires an understanding of how
constitutional rights come to be "clearly established."
The Supreme Court has made its decisions and those of the lower federal
courts the primary sources of "clearly established" rights. Of course, the text
of the Constitution initially establishes constitutional rights, and the text is
sometimes enough, standing alone, to determine that an official has violated
"clearly established" rights.3°6 Often, however, constitutional text alone
speaks with "majestic simplicity '30 7 of broad, vague concepts such as "due
process. 30 8 The Court has held that qualified immunity analysis ordinarily
demands greater specificity:
[T]he right.., must have been "clearly established" in a more particularized,
and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be
304. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
305. See, e.g., Brousseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 196 (2004) ("When confronted
with a claim of qualified immunity, a court must ask first the following question: Taken in the
light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's
conduct violated a constitutional right?" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Saucer v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001))).
306. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741(2002) (explaining that "general statements
of the law are not inherently incapable of giving fair and clear warning" to officials that their
conduct is unlawful (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520
U.S. 259, 270 (1997))); see also Lassiter v. Ala. A & M Univ., 28 F.3d 1146, 1150 n.4 (11th
Cir. 1994) ("[Olccasionally the words of a federal statute or federal constitutional provision
will be specific enough to establish the law applicable to particular circumstances clearly and
to overcome qualified immunity even in the absence of case law.").
307. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979).
308. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987).
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sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is
doing violates that right. This is not to say that an official action is protected
by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been
held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the
unlawfulness must be apparent.
309
The Court looks primarily to its own decisions to determine clearly
established constitutional law. 310 It looks, as well, to decisions of federal
courts of appeals and state courts.31 1 Thus, for example, in a case asserting
constitutional tort claims against a police officer in Idaho, the Court would
consider decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which
encompasses Idaho, as well as Idaho state appellate court decisions. 31 2 The
Court may also consider decisions by other federal circuits and other state
courts even though they would not bind Idaho officials.
313
In addition to court decisions, political branch decisions can bear on
whether a constitutional right is a clearly established one of which a
reasonable official should have known. Legislation ordinarily gets a
presumption of constitutionality. 31 4 Thus, when a statute or ordinance
authorizes an official's conduct, it is presumptively reasonable for that
official to believe that his or her conduct does not violate clearly established
309. Id. at 640 (citations omitted).
310. See, e.g., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 556 (2004) ("No reasonable officer
could claim to be unaware of the basic rule, well established by our cases, that, absent consent
or exigency, a warrantless search of the home is presumptively unconstitutional.").
311. See, e.g., Hope, 536 U.S. at 741-44 (relying on precedent of the Eleventh Circuit
and its predecessor, the former Fifth Circuit, to reject a qualified immunity claim by Alabama
officials); United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 269 (1997) (observing that the Court has
"referred to decisions of the Courts of Appeals when enquiring whether a right was 'clearly
established"' for qualified immunity purposes); see also Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510,
513-16 (1994) (holding that the district court in the Ninth Circuit had to evaluate the claim of
qualified immunity in light of relevant Ninth Circuit precedent even though the precedent was
not cited in plaintiff's brief).
312. See Elder, 510 U.S. at 513-16; Sweaney v. Ada County, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th
Cir. 1997) (discussing a decision of the Idaho Court of Appeals in analyzing qualified
immunity).
313. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2004) (examining decisions by
Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits in a case from the Ninth Circuit).
314. See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450, 462 (1988) (noting that
social and economic legislation of the states gets a presumption of constitutionality).
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constitutional rights.315 The presumption is rebuttable, however, meaning
that an officer cannot reasonably rely on a patently unconstitutional
statute. 1 6 The Court has treated executive directives somewhat like statutes
and ordinances. The Court has held that executive policies and orders may
support the reasonableness of an official's conduct if the conduct comports
with the orders and policies and if there is no case law on point. 317 Lower
courts have gone farther, holding that officials have qualified immunity for
315. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-57 (1967) (holding that law
enforcement officers had qualified immunity "for acting under a statute that [the officer]
reasonably believed to be valid but that was later held unconstitutional on its face or as
applied"); Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1252 (10th Cir. 2003) ("[Tlhe existence of a
statute or ordinance authorizing particular conduct is a factor which militates in favor of the
conclusion that a reasonable official would find that conduct constitutional." (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Grossman v. City of Portland, 33 F.3d 1200, 1209 (9th Cir.
1994))); Connecticut v. Crotty, 346 F.3d 84, 102 (2d Cir. 2003) (considering "particularly
persuasive" the fact that "the challenged conduct involved enforcement of a presumptively
valid statute" in finding that officials had qualified immunity); Grossman, 33 F.3d at 1209-10
(holding that an officer had qualified immunity when he relied on a city ordinance to arrest
plaintiff for demonstrating in a park without a permit, and stating: "[Wihen a city council has
duly enacted an ordinance, police officers on the street are ordinarily entitled to rely on the
assumption that the council members have considered the views of legal counsel and
concluded that the ordinance is a valid and constitutional exercise of authority.");
Malachowski v. City of Keene, 787 F.2d 704, 714 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that an officer had
qualified immunity for arresting plaintiffs' daughter under state statutory provisions that were
not "illegitimate on their face").
316. See, e.g., Grossman, 33 F.3d at 1209 ("[A]s historical events such as the
Holocaust and the My Lai massacre demonstrate, individuals cannot always be held immune
for the results of their official conduct simply because they were enforcing policies or orders
promulgated by those with superior authority. When a statute authorizes official conduct
which is patently violative of fundamental constitutional principles, an officer who enforces
that statute is not entitled to qualified immunity.").
317. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999) (stating that the Marshals Service
policy authorizing defendant officials' conduct was "important" to the Court's conclusion that
those officials had qualified immunity, because "the state of the law . . . was at best
undeveloped"); see also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 744-45 (2002) (stating that the advice
by the U.S. Department of Justice to Alabama that condemned Alabama's use of the "hitching
post" to punish prisoners "buttressed" the Court's conclusion that Alabama officials violated a
clearly established law and therefore could not claim qualified immunity); Wallace v. King,
626 F.2d 1157, 1161 (4th Cir. 1980) ("[Llaw enforcement officers should not be held
personally liable for monetary damages because they have followed the policy or instructions
of their superiors [when conducting a search], where the controlling law had not been
authoritatively decided by the Supreme Court [or other relevant courts], where the officers
have acted in good faith, and where the searches were conducted in a reasonable manner.").
20061
RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL
following executive policies or orders that they reasonably believe are
lawful. 31 8 By the same token, the lower courts have made clear that officials
cannot get qualified immunity merely by establishing that they were "just
following orders. 319 Qualified immunity doctrine thus contains no
"Nuremberg defense" that would let officials rely on plainly unconstitutional
legislation or executive directives.32° On the other hand, if legislation or an
318. Brent v. Ashley, 247 F.3d 1294, 1305-06 (11 th Cir. 2001) (holding that low-level
officers involved in a strip search had qualified immunity when they "acted at the order of a
superior and the record reflects no reason why any of them should question the validity of that
order"); Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1449 (9th Cir. 1994) (relying "principally on the fact
that the policy ... was a longstanding official policy, which was well-known and similar to
the policies employed in many police departments throughout the nation, none of which had
been judicially questioned" in holding that officers had qualified immunity from constitutional
claims based on their acting under a police department policy for use of police dogs in making
arrests); Dodd v. City of Norwich, 827 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that on remand the
district court should consider "whether [defendant police officer] is entitled to a qualified
good faith immunity based on his following the policy and training of the police department in
keeping his gun unholstered while attempting to place handcuffs on [the boy]" in an action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state tort law against the police officer by the mother of a sixteen-
year-old boy who was shot after trying to grab the police officer's gun while the officer was
arresting him); Sullivan v. Town of Salem, 805 F.2d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding that zoning
officials would have qualified immunity from a builder's claim if they "were simply
implementing an established policy of the town" and reasonably relied on the policy);
Landrum v. Moats, 576 F.2d 1320, 1323, 1328 & n.16 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding that police
officers sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for their use of deadly force were entitled to rely on
provisions in a police manual authorizing their conduct, even though those provisions were
later held to violate state law). But cf. Cal. Att'ys for Criminal Justice v. Butts, 195 F.3d 1039,
1049-50 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that it was not objectively reasonable for officers to rely on
training materials on how to interrogate suspects who had invoked their Miranda rights).
319. Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1252 (10th Cir. 2003) (stating that "an
officer's reliance on an authorizing statute does not render the conduct per se reasonable" for
qualified immunity purposes); Collins v. Jordan, 110 F.3d 1363, 1377-78 (9th Cir. 1997)
(finding that officers could not reasonably rely on an emergency order to the extent it
conflicted with longstanding state law, which reflected First Amendment constraints,
authorizing police to disperse assemblies "only when they constitute a clear and present
danger").
320. See O'Rourke v. Hayes, 378 F.3d 1201, 1210 n.5 (lth Cir. 2004) ("[S]ince
World War H, the 'just following orders' defense has not occupied a respected position in our
jurisprudence, and officers in such cases may be held liable under § 1983 if there is 'a reason
why any of them should question the validity of that order."' (quoting Brent v. Ashley, 247
F.3d 1294, 1306 (11th Cir. 2001))); see also Sheldon Nahmod, From the Courtroom to the
Street: Court Orders and Section 1983, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 613, 635-36 (2002)
(arguing that a Nuremberg-type defense would not defeat the liability of a police officer for
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executive directive is not obviously invalid and authorizes or compels an
official to act as he or she did, it is harder to conclude that the official
"should have known" the action violated "clearly established" rights.
2. Application of Qualified Immunity Doctrine to the Torture Scenarios
a. The "Discretionary Function" Element of the Harlow Test
The discretionary function element of the Harlow standard probably will
not deprive any of the U.S. officials in our scenarios of qualified immunity.
The military police guards in the Abu Ghraib scenario were exercising
discretion, for purposes of the Harlow standard, when they tortured Ali to
"loosen him up" for interrogation. That is because the "loosen him up"
instruction did not prescribe a precise course of conduct for the guards. To
the contrary, it allowed "brutal improvisation. 321 It does not matter for
qualified immunity analysis, as distinguished from FTCA analysis, that this
322improvisation may not be susceptible to public policy considerations. Nor,
under Davis v. Scherer, does it matter that this improvisation "violat[ed] the
clear command[s]" of statutes and regulations, because the violation of
statutes and regulations cannot be the basis for a constitutional tort claim
under Bivens.
323
A similar analysis applies to the GTMO scenario. The GTMO
interrogators used interrogation methods that they reasonably believed the
complying with a judge's order to shoot a lawyer). Sometimes, however, an officer's reliance
on an unconstitutional statute, ordinance, order or policy may negate the state of mind
required to establish a constitutional violation. For example, the court in Menotti v. City of
Seattle rejected a First Amendment claim against an officer who took away a protestor's sign
because the officer's actions were merely to enforce an ordinance, later held unconstitutional,
and were not "motivated by opposition to [the protestor's] political beliefs or ... a desire to
chill [the protestor's] speech." See 409 F.3d 1113, 1153-55 (9th Cir. 2005).
321. See White, supra note 125, at Al; see also DANNER, supra note 1, at 8 ("[W]hen
Specialist Sabrina Harman was asked about the [Abu Ghraib] prisoner who was placed on a
box with electric wires attached to his fingers, toes, and penis, in an image now famous
throughout the world, she replied that 'her job was to keep detainees awake."'); HERSH, supra
note 1, at 34 (reporting on a military captain who refused instructions from military
intelligence officers to keep detainees awake around the clock, explaining: "[M]y soldiers
don't know how to do it. And when you ask an eighteen-year-old kid to keep someone awake,
and he doesn't know how to do it, he's going to get creative.").
322. See supra text accompanying notes 143-47.
323. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194 n.12 (1984).
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Secretary of Defense had authorized.324 Judging from actual public records, it
does not appear that the interrogation methods actually authorized by
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld for use at GTMO prescribed a
precise course for the interrogators to follow. Instead, public documents from
the Defense Department gave authorized interrogation methods only
evocative names such as "fear up harsh" and described them in broad terms,
such as, in the case of "fear up": "Significantly increasing the fear level in a
detainee. 325 Maybe it was unreasonable, as well as unlawful under
applicable statutes and regulations, for GTMO interrogators to believe that
their authority to use the "fear up harsh" method included measures that
amounted to torture and that, in one case, caused death.326 Yet the
unreasonableness of their belief and the illegality of their conduct do not
make that conduct nondiscretionary for purposes of qualified immunity
analysis. If those factors have any relevance, it is to the second step of
Harlow analysis, which asks whether they violated "clearly established"
constitutional rights of which a reasonable officer would have known.
Specifically, if a reasonable officer should have known that the statutes and
the regulations that she was violating were designed to safeguard
constitutional rights, then the constitutional rights that were violated in the
course of violating the statutes and the regulations might be "clearly
established," partly by the very existence of the statutes and the
regulations. 2 7
Of the three scenarios, the Syrian rendition scenario is the least likely to
involve a discretionary function for purposes of the Harlow standard.
Whether the conduct in that scenario is discretionary depends on whether
both the decision to render Sami to Syria and the details of his rendition are
made by high-level officials, leaving only essentially ministerial tasks for the
officials who actually arranged for Sami's rendition. Sami could shape his
argument to maximize the chance that a court would find the officials'
conduct ministerial. To do that, Sami should emphasize that the rendition
policy on its face violated the Constitution, regardless of how it was
implemented by the minions who put Sami on the plane from New York to
Damascus. Given that emphasis, a court might hold that the officials were
not exercising discretionary functions and therefore could not claim qualified
324. See supra text accompanying note 7.
325. Apr. 16 Memo, supra note 7, at 361; see supra text accompanying note 155.
326. See generally White, supra note 125 (reporting that two Army soldiers involved
in the sleeping bag killing were being prosecuted).
327. See infra notes 355-56 and accompanying text.
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immunity. Those officials' best bet would then be to argue for derivative
qualified immunity.328 Under the theory of derivative qualified immunity,
officials are immune from liability for implementing a policy if that policy,
though unconstitutional, did not violate clearly established constitutional
rights.329 The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the validity of derivative
qualified immunity.33°
b. The "Clearly Established" Element of the Harlow Test
As discussed in the subsection above, for purposes of the Harlow test,
the torture in our scenarios probably involves, directly or derivatively, the
exercise of discretionary functions. If so, then the officials responsible for the
torture will have qualified immunity from Bivens claims unless they violated
"clearly established" constitutional rights of which a reasonable official
would have known. Clarity is a tricky concept in this setting. It is unclear
whether official torture is always unconstitutional; it depends partly on how
you define "torture. 33' On the other hand, some instances of official torture
may be clearly unconstitutional. The tough question is whether a particular
instance, such as those described in our scenarios, falls into the "clearly
established" arena.
As discussed above, torture potentially violates the Fourth, Fifth, and
Eighth Amendments.332 The standards for identifying those violations ask,
respectively, whether physical or psychological force is "excessive,"
333
"shocks the conscience, '334 or is "cruel and unusual. 335 Although these
328. See Varrone v. Bilotti, 123 F.3d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that, even if police
officers performed only a ministerial function in conducting a strip search, "they still have
qualified immunity for carrying out the order, not facially invalid, issued by a superior officer
who is protected by qualified immunity").
329. See id. at 81-82.
330. Cf. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 810-11 (1982) (rejecting an argument that
presidential aides are entitled to derivative absolute immunity).
331. See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann, Guantdnamo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 263,
326 (2004) (stating in a discussion of torture claims that contours of the Fourth Amendment
and Due Process Clause are "unclear"); Marcy Strauss, Torture, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 201,
207 (2003-2004) (stating that, in contrast to torture undertaken to get evidence for a
prosecution, "[w]hether torture undertaken solely to obtain information to prevent an
imminent terrorist attack violates the Constitution... is not as clear").
332. See supra notes 255-57 and accompanying text; infra note 336.
333. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-97 (1989).
334. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846-50 (1998).
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336standards differ in important ways, each standard typically requires
judgments about whether a particular instance of physical or psychological
force departs from the norm and from what is necessary in light of a
legitimate justification, if any, for the conduct. Specifically, the Court bases
excessive force determinations on, among other factors, whether the
challenged conduct departs from usual government practices and whether it
is justified by the need to prevent an individual from harming government
officials or the public.337 The Court determines whether conduct is
conscience-shocking by considering, among other factors, whether it is
"egregious," which is often true when it is "intended to injure in some way
unjustifiable by any government interest. ', 338 Finally, the Court determines
whether punishment is "cruel and unusual" by assessing, among other
factors, its prevalence as an authorized method of punishment 339 and whether
335. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
336. Specifically, Fourth Amendment excessive force determinations entail an
objective, "reasonable law enforcement officer" determination, whereas Eighth Amendment
"cruel and unusual punishment" determinations consider an official's subjective state of mind.
See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-99. In addition, as applied to the official use of physical and
psychological force, the protections of the Fourth Amendment, substantive due process, and
the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause differ in when and to whom
they apply. Roughly speaking, the Due Process Clause's substantive component restricts
official force against a person who has not been detained or who has been detained but is not
being interrogated and has not received a formal punishment; the Fourth Amendment's ban on
excessive force applies to the arrest and detention of a person who has not yet been formally
punished; and the Eighth Amendment applies to the treatment of someone who has received a
formal punishment. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 842-43; Graham, 490 U.S. at 392 n.6; Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 & n.16 (1979); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40
(1977).
337. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (stating that courts analyzing excessive force claims
under the Fourth Amendment should consider, among other factors, "whether the suspect
poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others"); Tennessee v. Garner, 471
U.S. 1, 13-19 (1985) (considering policies of major police departments in determining when
the Fourth Amendment allows the use of deadly force).
338. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 774-75 (2003) (plurality opinion); see Lewis,
523 U.S. at 846 (stating that government action may be so arbitrary to violate substantive due
process when it involves the exercise of power "without any reasonable justification in the
service of a legitimate governmental objective" and that "only the most egregious" official
conduct can be said to be "arbitrary in the constitutional sense" (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S 115, 129 (1992))).
339. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1194 (2005) (holding that the
execution of individuals who were younger than eighteen years old at the time of their crime
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it is justified by a legitimate purpose or is, instead, "unnecessary and ...
totally without penological justification."340 In sum, the three constitutional
provisions are similar in restricting the official use of extreme and unjustified
physical and psychological force.
Even at this level of generality, the Abu Ghraib torture probably
violated clearly established rights. The Abu Ghraib guards acted solely for
their own sadistic purposes when they tortured Ali. They used the "loosen
him up" instruction as a pretext for indulging their sadistic streak.34 ' Thus,
their conduct had no legitimate justification. Furthermore, the conduct was
extreme in its departure from standard interrogation methods. 342 For these
violates the Eighth Amendment, based partly on the fact that "[a] majority of States have
rejected the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders under 18").
340. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981); see also id. at 347 (explaining
that denial of medical care to prisoners can constitute cruel and unusual punishment "because,
in the worst case, it can result in physical torture, and, even in less serious cases, it can result
in pain without any penological purpose").
341. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
342. Until December 2002, the interrogation methods authorized for detainees in the
war on terrorism were the standard interrogation methods set forth in the U.S. Army's Field
Manual 34-52. Sean D. Murphy, Executive Branch Memoranda on Status and Permissible
Treatment of Detainees, 98 Am. J. INT'L L. 820, 824 & n.44 (2004); see also U.S. Dep'ts of the
Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps, Army Regulation 190-8/OPNAVINST
3461.6/AFJI 31-304/MCO 3461.1, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian
Internees and Other Detainees 3-4 (1997), available at http://www.au.af.nillau/awc/awcgate/
law/arl90-8.pdf (providing procedures for the "[o]peration of prisoner of war internment
facilities"). In October 2002, however, officials at GTMO asked officials in Washington to
authorize "counter-resistant" interrogation techniques over and above "current interrogation
methods." Memorandum from General James T. Hill, U.S. Commander, Dep't of Def. to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 25, 2002), reprinted in
TORTURE PAPERs, supra note 1, at 223. This led to expanded interrogation methods for use at
GTMO. See Nov. 27 Action Memo, supra note 7, at 237 (indicating the Secretary of
Defense's approval of "Category II" techniques); Apr. 16 Memo, supra note 7, at 360-61
(authorizing a more limited set of interrogation techniques). Interrogation methods used at
GTMO eventually migrated to Abu Ghraib and other U.S. prisons in Iraq and Afghanistan.
See Schlesinger Report, supra note 1, at 941. Apparently in response to public outcry at the
abuses at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere, in November 2005 the Department of Defense issued a
directive stating it to be "DoD policy that ... [a]l captured or detained personnel shall be
treated humanely, and all intelligence interrogations, debriefings, or tactical questioning to
gain intelligence from captured or detained personnel shall be conducted humanely, in
accordance with applicable law and policy," including "the law of war, relevant international
law, [and] U.S. law." Department of Defense Directive No. 3115.09, § 3.1 (Nov. 3, 2005),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d3115_09.pdf. In addition, the new Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 prohibits "any treatment or technique of interrogation not authorized
20061
RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:715
reasons, it probably not only violated Ali's constitutional rights, but, indeed,
constituted a clear violation of those rights. No reasonable officer can believe
it is constitutional to brutalize a detainee for the officer's own enjoyment. 3
The other scenarios present closer cases. Unlike the Abu Ghraib torture,
the torture in the GTMO and Syrian rendition scenarios has a purpose that is
generally legitimate: to get information for fighting the war on terrorism.30
Whether that purpose ever justifies torture lies at the heart of torture's
constitutionality under the relevant constitutional standards, which, as
discussed above, take into account the justification for official use of
by and listed in the United States Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation." Pub. L.
No. 109-148, § 1002(a), 119 Stat. 2680, 2739 (Dec. 30,2005).
343. Analysis of the actual events at Abu Ghraib is more difficultthan analysis of the
Abu Ghraib scenario discussed in this Article because it is hard to read people's minds.
Analysis of the actual abuse would depend on, among other issues, whether the guards really
acted as they did in the belief that they were obeying the "loosen them up" instruction. If so,
they might show that they did not violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable
person would have known. From published reports, it appears that the guards were young, had
received little or no training on how to be prison guards, and were subject to inconsistent
commands from the regular military leaders and from military intelligence officials. E.g.,
Schlesinger Report, supra note 1, at 934 (noting that "generally training [for Military Police
Mission] was inadequate"); Josh White, Dog Handler Found Guilty of Abu Ghraib Abuse,
WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2006, at A8 (reporting on the testimony of Col. Thomas M. Pappas, top
military intelligence official at Abu Ghraib, in which he admitted that he had not ensured dog
handlers had adequate training to use them to control detainees); Josh White, Former Abu
Ghraib Guard Calls Top Brass Culpable for Abuse, WASH. POST, Jan 23, 2006, at A3
(reporting the assertion of a former guard at Abu Ghraib that she had "received no training" in
treatment of detainees). Furthermore, conditions at Abu Ghraib were exigent. The guards were
grossly outnumbered by the detainees; the facility was in an active combat zone full of killing
and maiming; and military leadership was inadequate. See id at 928 (finding that "weak and
ineffectual leadership.. . allowed the abuses at Abu Ghraib"); see id at 937 (noting that the
ratio of detainees to guards was 75:1 and the facility was "smack in the middle of a combat
environment"). Add to those circumstances that many detainees were violent criminals and
that some detainees were believed to have valuable military intelligence information. See id. at
940, 944 (discussing official pressure to produce actionable intelligence from the Abu Ghraib
detainees and stating that the Abu Ghraib prison contained Iraqi criminals). In my view,
unfortunately, it is hard under these circumstances to conclude that soldiers in their late teens
and early twenties "should have known" that they were violating "clearly established"
constitutional rights if they reasonably believed they were following orders.
344. See Russell A. Miller, Before the Law: Military Investigations and Evidence at
the Iraqi Special Tribunal, 13 MIcH. ST. J. INT'L L. 107, 132-33 (2005) (discussing the laws of
war and the military regulations recognizing that detained combatants will be interrogated for
military intelligence by the detaining authority).
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psychological and physical force against individuals.345 The issue of whether
torture is ever constitutional, in turn, naturally bears on whether the specific
instances of torture in our three scenarios violate "clearly established"
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person should have known.
Torture that serves no legitimate purpose, such as in the Abu Ghraib
scenario, may not only violate the Constitution, but also do so clearly. On the
flip side, torture that serves a generally legitimate purpose, such as
intelligence gathering, may be constitutional-or at least arguably
constitutional-in some circumstances.
The objective of getting information to protect the public justifies some
official pressure in police interrogations upon a person whom the police have
probable cause to believe committed a crime. 346 It is clearly established,
however, that police torture of suspects violates the Constitution. That is the
teaching of a long line of Supreme Court cases originating in the first half of
the twentieth century with cases such as Brown v. Mississippi.347 Those cases
involved the police use of extreme physical and psychological force,
sometimes comparable to that of our scenarios, against suspects in custody.
Supreme Court cases involving local police brutality are the most relevant
precedent on the constitutionality of torture in the war on terrorism.
Whether those police cases "clearly establish" the law applicable to our
torture scenarios, as well as to actual events in the war on terrorism, depends
partly on whether one regards that war as a real war or, instead, a
metaphorical one. In a real war, violence is a norm. In particular, courts give
345. See supra notes 332-40 and accompanying text; see also Sanford Levinson,
Torture in Iraq and the Rule of Law in America, 133 DAEDALUS, Summer 2004, at 5,
reprinted in IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY: AMERICAN WAR CRIMES IN IRAQ AND BEYOND 180,
184 (Jeremy Brecher et al. eds., 2005) (discussing the maxim of a Nazi legal philosopher in
constitutional-law terms as relevant to torture in the war on terrorism: "[E]very norm is
subject to limitation when a compelling interest is successfully asserted, and it is hard to think
of a more compelling interest than the prevention of violent death at the hands of a hostile
group.").
346. See, e.g., United States v. Astello, 241 F.3d 965, 967 (8th Cir. 2001) ("Obviously,
interrogation of a suspect will involve some pressure because its purpose is to elicit a
confession. In order to obtain the desired result, interrogators use a laundry list of tactics.
Numerous cases have held that questioning tactics such as a raised voice, deception, or a
sympathetic attitude on the part of the interrogator will not render a confession involuntary
unless the overall impact of the interrogation caused the defendant's will to be overborne."
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (quoting Jennifer v. Smith, 982 F.2d 329, 334
(8th Cir. 1993))).
347. See 297 U.S. 278, 280-87 (1936); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 446
n.6 (1966) (citing other cases in the Brown line).
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the executive branch broad discretion to detain combatants.348 That discretion
may extend to the government's determination of appropriate conditions of
detention.349 Some argue, however, that the war on terrorism is more
appropriately conceived of as a law-enforcement response to criminal acts.
350
Under that conception, the Brown line of cases might not only establish the
unconstitutionality of torturing detainees in the war on terrorism, but also do
so clearly. Under the competing conception that considers the United States
to be in an actual war, the Brown cases may establish unconstitutionality, but
differ too much in their setting to do so clearly.
The GTMO and Syrian rendition scenarios differ from the Abu Ghraib
scenario not only in involving the generally legitimate objective of gathering
intelligence, but also in involving officials carrying out orders from high-
level executive officials. The GTMO interrogators reasonably believe they
are using interrogation methods authorized by the Secretary of Defense; the
U.S. officials who render Sami to Syria are obeying CIA policy.351 In reality,
the Department of Defense policies and the CIA program had support from
the Justice Department materials advocating a narrow definition of torture.352
The Court has held that the existence of executive pronouncements
authorizing an official's conduct can be an "important" factor supporting
348. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) ("The capture and detention of
lawful combatants and the capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants, by 'universal
agreement and practice,' are 'important incident[s] of war." (alteration in original) (quoting Ex
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942))); id. at 531 (stating, in the course of discussing due
process requirements for the government's classification of people as enemy combatants, that
"[wlithout doubt, our Constitution recognizes that core strategic matters of warmaking belong
in the hands of those who are best positioned and most politically accountable for making
them").
349. Cf Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003) (applying deferential standard
of review to prison visitation regulations challenged on constitutional grounds).
350. See, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception
and the Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001, 1023 (2004) ("[Nlations have a
choice between thinking of terrorist attacks as large crimes (on the model of organized crime
or other criminal conspiracies) or as small wars (on the model of insurgent attacks)."). But cf.
Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 274 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) ("[T]he question whether torture
could be used to extract evidence for the purpose of prosecuting criminal conduct [is] a very
different question from the [question] ... whether substantive due process would erect a per
se bar to coercive investigations, including torture, for the purpose of preventing a terrorist
attack.").
351. See supra Part I.B-C.
352. See Torture Memo, supra note 137, at 2-13.
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qualified immunity when the relevant law is otherwise "undeveloped., 353
Some lower courts hold that, even if some relevant case law exists, officials
have qualified immunity when they rely on executive orders or policies that
they reasonably believe are valid.354 This precedent supports claims of
qualified immunity by the U.S. officials in the GTMO and Syrian rendition
scenarios, considering the high-level executive-branch pronouncements that
encouraged or authorized torture and the unsettled constitutionality of torture
in its various definitions.
Despite such high-level pronouncements, of course, many federal
statutes and military directives prohibit torture and other inhumane treatment
of detainees.355 Thus, Bivens claims against the officials involved in our
scenarios will require courts to determine whether the executive directives
that the officials followed conflict with those statutes and regulations. If so,
and if the officials should have realized the conflict and, in light of the
conflict, should have known that their conduct would violate the detainees'
constitutional rights, then their reliance on the executive directive will do
them no good in establishing qualified immunity.356 Another possibility,
however, is that the executive pronouncements that seemed to condone
torture prevented even reasonable soldiers from appreciating the clear
unconstitutionality of torturing detainees.
3. Summary of Bivens Analysis of Torture Claims
Bivens claims for U.S. torture have three levels of complexity. First, the
constitutionality of torture raises difficult questions under the Fourth, Fifth,
and Eighth Amendments. A second level of complexity involves determining
when, if ever, "special factors counselling hesitation" will bar a Bivens claim
even when the torture violates the Constitution. The third level of complexity
arises from qualified immunity defenses.
353. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999) (stating that a Marshals Service
policy authorizing defendant officials' conduct was "important" to the Court's conclusion that
those officials had qualified immunity from constitutional tort claim, because "the state of the
law... was at best undeveloped").
354. See supra note 318 and accompanying text.
355. See supra note 137 (citing sources).
356. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 564 (2004) (denying qualified immunity in
part because internal guideline of Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms "placed
[defendant] on notice that he might be liable for executing a manifestly invalid warrant").
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E. Adequacy of Bivens Actions for U.S.-Sanctioned Torture
For reasons discussed in Part HID, the FTCA provides a poor vehicle for
handling torture claims against the United States.357 Likewise, the
constitutional tort doctrine that has grown out of Bivens provides a poor
vehicle for handling torture claims against U.S. officials.
The FTCA and Bivens share a fundamental problem: they require torture
to be treated as a mere intentional tort.358 As limited by the defense of
qualified immunity, Bivens is designed primarily to impose liability upon the
rogue officer who violates someone's constitutional rights either deliberately
or out of "plain[] incompetent[ce]," but not upon the competent and
conscientious officer who violates constitutional rights in a reasonable
attempt to follow orders.359 The idea is that the specter of tort liability in the
latter situation could discourage competent and conscientious officials from
doing their duty. The government's interest in officials doing their duty
might justify denying a remedy for an individual official's tort, even a
constitutional tort. But U.S.-sanctioned torture, as the reality-based scenarios
analyzed in this Article illustrate, is typically more than just a tort conducted
by an individual rogue official. U.S.-sanctioned torture reflects a failure and
a perversion in the command structure. It is therefore willful blindness to
treat such torture, as Bivens analysis would have it, as one errant official's
tort.
Bivens suffers from additional flaws besides being designed primarily for
the torts of rogue individual officers. These additional flaws do not just affect
Bivens claims for torture, but they are particularly acute in this context and
therefore warrant examination.
As a deterrent to U.S.-sanctioned torture, Bivens is underinclusive. To
begin with, Bivens does not make officials liable for all violations of the law,
only for violations of certain constitutional provisions.360 In addition,
qualified immunity restricts Bivens liability to only clear constitutional
violations. The constitutional rights of torture victims are not clear.36 ' In their
357. See supra Part III.D.
358. See supra Part III.D.
359. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (explaining that qualified immunity
"provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate
the law").
360. See, e.g., Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001) ("The purpose of
Bivens is to deter individual federal officers from committing constitutional violations.").
361. See supra notes 341-56 and accompanying text.
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currently undeveloped state, constitutional rights do not do much good for
torture victims. Torture victims would be better served by a doctrine that
creates civil liability for officials' clear violations of statutes and regulations
barring the mistreatment of detainees.
Even for clear constitutional violations, Bivens is underinclusive. At least
two factors can defeat Bivens liability for clear constitutional violations. Both
factors stem from Bivens's focus on the conduct of the individual officials
named as defendants. Each factor may operate strongly in Bivens claims for
U.S. torture.
First, a Bivens defendant may be comparatively sympathetic in the eyes
of the jury hearing the Bivens claim. Bivens liability usually rolls downhill,
attaching, if at all, to the "street-level" officials who actually inflict the injury
that gives rise to the Bivens suit.362 Those officials may appear as scapegoats
to the jury. Take, for example, a case for police brutality during an arrest.
The victim may have just been arrested for a serious crime. The officer may
have been acting under conditions of great stress, uncertainty, and danger. In
addition, the officer may have been badly trained, poorly equipped, and
overworked. None of these circumstances is the officer's fault. What is
worse is that perhaps the officer's superiors tolerate and even encourage
brutality toward arrestees. Under these circumstances, some juries may
refuse to hold the Bivens defendant liable even for a clear-cut violation of
constitutional rights, on the view that the arrestee deserved it or that, in any
event, the officer's superiors are really to blame. The individual defendants'
violations get excused by jury nullification.
The risk of nullification may be particularly great in cases involving the
torture of suspected terrorists. This class of Bivens plaintiffs may be even
less sympathetic than the typical victim of police brutality. On the flip side,
the official who inflicts the torture may be perceived by the jury as acting
under circumstances of even greater danger and uncertainty than the typical
officer charged with police brutality. The jury may be even more willing than
in a police brutality case to believe the official who tortured a suspected
terrorist is a mere scapegoat for policies and problems higher up in the chain
of command. For these reasons, the risk of jury nullification in Bivens suits
for U.S. torture might be high.
The second factor limiting Bivens liability even for clear constitutional
violations reflects that most Bivens actions do not get to a jury. They get
362. See Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public
Officials' Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEo. L.J. 65, 93 (1999) (observing that "the
most frequent Bivens defendants" are "'street level' public officials").
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resolved before trial, partly because of doctrines encouraging earlier
resolution through devices such as summary judgment on an official's
defense of qualified immunity.363 To rule on that defense, the court examines
the individual officer's conduct. The court must determine whether that
conduct violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights and whether the violation
was one of which a reasonable officer in the defendant official's
circumstances should have known. Because the analysis focuses on the
individual officials named as defendants, a court may determine that no
single official's conduct, standing alone, violated the Constitution or, at least,
did so in a way that should have been clear to that official, even though the
conduct of various officials, in the aggregate, did violate the plaintiff's
constitutional rights.
A recent Supreme Court case illustrates the point. In Hope v. Pelzer, the
Court reviewed a constitutional tort claim by an Alabama prisoner, Hope,
who was twice handcuffed to a "hitching post" as punishment for
misconduct.364 The second time, Hope spent seven hours on the post,
standing shirtless in the sun; he got water to drink only once or twice and no
bathroom breaks.365 Hope sued three prison guards, each of whom asserted
qualified immunity. 366 The Court held that, as alleged by Hope, the hitching
post incidents violated Hope's clearly established rights under the Eighth
Amendment.367 As Justice Thomas explained in dissent, however, "When
one examines the alleged conduct of the prison guards who are parties to this
action, as opposed to the alleged conduct of other guards, who are not parties
to this action, [Hope's] case becomes far less compelling" than it is when
one considers the prison officials' conduct in the aggregate.368 Two of the
three guards named as defendants played no role in the second, more brutal
hitching incident. 369 The third guard named as a defendant was alleged to
363. See, e.g., Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 311 (1996) (declaring that an official
who seeks summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity and has it denied by a trial
court can take immediate interlocutory appeal, even if she has already so appealed a prior
order, to the extent that the trial court's ruling turned on an issue of law); Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814-18 (1982) (abandoning the subjective element of the Court's
existing test for qualified immunity because it prevented early disposition of qualified
immunity defenses).
364. 536 U.S. 728, 733-35 (2002).
365. Id. at 734-35.
366. Id. at 735.
367. Id. at 741.
368. Id. at 749 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Scalia, J.).
369. Id. at 749-50.
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have handcuffed Hope to the hitching post in the second incident, but not to
have been responsible for his being shirtless in the sun for seven hours and
being given little water and no bathroom breaks.3 7 ° Justice Thomas
concluded, "Once one understands [Hope's] specific allegations against
[each of the defendant guards], the Eighth Amendment violation in this case
is far from obvious., 371 The majority did not disagree with Justice Thomas's
"thoughtful" analysis; instead, the majority simply observed that the Court
had not taken the case to decide-and therefore left to be determined on
remand-"the questions whether or to what extent the three named officers
may be held responsible for the acts charged, if proved. 372 Thus, the
majority's decision leaves open the possibility that none of the officials
named as defendants will be found to have violated Hope's clearly
established rights even though a clear violation of Hope's constitutional
rights occurred at the collective hands of the Alabama prison system.
From Hope one can easily imagine a case in which a suspected terrorist
suffers unconstitutional torture at the hands of many officials, no one of
whom acted in a way that was clearly unconstitutional. A person may suffer
torture through a combination of circumstances for which no one official is
or can be proven to have been responsible. For example, separate officials
may be responsible for conditions inside the detainee's cell; the detainee's
meals; the detainee's medical needs; and the detainee's interrogations.373
Likewise, official responsibility for setting policy on each of these issues can
be highly diffuse.374 One high-level official issues an order to "exploit
370. Id. at 750.
371. Id. at 751 (internal quotation marks omitted).
372. Id. at 746 (majority opinion); see also Brent v. Ashley, 247 F.3d 1294, 1306 (11 th
Cir. 2001) (examining the conduct of each of the six officials involved in a strip-search of
plaintiff to determine whether any of the officials violated plaintiffs clearly established
constitutional rights, and holding that none of those officials did so).
373. To cite an actual example, Manadel al-Jamadi apparently died at Abu Ghraib
prison because one set of CIA officials broke his ribs, and thereafter, other CIA officials
handcuffed him in a position that would have made it hard for him to breathe, even if his ribs
had not been broken. The combination caused him to die of "compromised respiration." See
Mayer, supra note 180, at 48-50.
374. See DANNER, supra note 1, at 10 ("We've now had fifteen of the highest-level
officials involved in this entire operation [testify], from the secretary of defense to the
generals in command, and nobody knew that anything was amiss, . . . nobody did anything
amiss. We have a general acceptance of responsibility, but there's no one to blame, except for
the people at the very bottom of one prison." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sen.
Mark Drayton's statement at a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on May
18, 2004, into U.S. abuse of detainees in the war on terrorism)).
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internees for actionable intelligence"; an official lower down the chain
implements that order by issuing standard operating procedures for use at a
particular facility; the procedures are vague enough that they are understood
by still lower-level officials to allow the incidents depicted in the Abu
Ghraib and GTMO scenarios described in Part 1.375 Thus, the systemic nature
of official torture makes it particularly difficult to hold any one official
responsible under Bivens, with the possible exception of the most sadistic,
low-level officials, 376 and, to add insult to injury, these low-level officials
will often be judgment proof.
377
Bivens' focus on individual officials prevents it from being an effective
deterrent to, or remedy for, unconstitutional conduct. This failing, though
significant, should not obscure the more fundamental problem that the
Constitution in its current state will not clearly identify-and therefore will
not create Bivens liability for-all instances of official torture. If we want to
retain Bivens or create some other system for holding individual officials
personally liable for torture, we should at the very least not use the
Constitution as the sole standard for liability.
F. A Proposed Reform of the Law on Torture Claims Against U.S. Officials
Under current law, U.S. officials can seldom be held civilly liable for
torture. This would not be so bad if the United States itself could be held
civilly liable for torture by its officials. In that event, the victims of torture
could get a remedy; the United States would presumably have an incentive to
375. See DANNER, supra note 1, at 12 (quoting a classified memorandum in which
Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, overall commander in Iraq, instructed interrogators to
work with military police guards to "manipulate an internee's emotions and weaknesses" for
interrogation purposes); id. at 43 (quoting an order to Major General Geoffrey Miller to
"rapidly exploit [Abu Ghraib] internees for actionable intelligence"); Taguba Report, supra
note 1, at 409 (finding that Major General Geoffrey Miller recommended that a set of guards
at Abu Ghraib be trained to "set[] the conditions for the successful interrogation and
exploitation of internees/detainees").
376. See supra note 362 and accompanying text.
377. See S. REP. No. 93-588, at 3-4 (1973) (stating in the legislative history of the
FrCA's law enforcement proviso that Bivens defendants are often effectively judgment
proof). For example, one of the guards convicted of abusing prisoners at Abu Ghraib was
earning less than $2000 per month when charges against him were filed. See Charge Sheet for
Charles A. Graner, Jr., Dec. 20, 2001, available at http://news.findlaw.comlhdocsldocsliraq/
graner51404chrg.html (charging a participant in the Abu Ghraib prison abuses with violations
of four articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice).
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prevent its officials from committing torture; 37 8 and the United States could
prevent torture in a variety of ways, such as through training, disciplinary
measures, and criminal prosecution. However, under current law the United
States can almost never be held liable for torture by its officials.379
Furthermore, even under the legislative reform that I proposed earlier in this
Article,380 the United States would often escape liability for torture by its
officials.381 Therefore, unless the law provides for U.S. officials themselves
to be liable for torture, torture victims will often have no remedy for torture,
and the threat of civil liability will not serve as much of a deterrent. In my
view, two alternative legislative measures would improve the law on torture
claims against U.S. officials.
First, Congress could enact legislation making U.S. officials personally
liable for torture under the same circumstances as state or local officials
would be under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.382 There is one main justification for this
proposal to use § 1983, rather than Bivens, to evaluate federal officials'
liability for torture. Bivens creates a cause of action only for violations of
certain constitutional provisions. In contrast, § 1983 creates a cause of action
not only for violations of the Constitution, but also for violations of federal
rights created by statute or regulation.383 The difference is relevant because,
even when torture does not violate "clearly established" constitutional rights,
it may clearly violate any number of federal statutes and regulations. For this
reason, torture victims would benefit more from a civil remedy for violations
of these statutes and regulations than for constitutional violations. By the
378. See PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CrnZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL
WRONGS 16-19 (1983). But cf Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics,
and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 345, 362 (2000) (concluding
that "there is little reason to believe that constitutional cost remedies [for example,
constitutional torts] are useful tools for shaping governmental behavior," based on differences
between the government and the private sector).
379. See supra Part III.
380. See supra note 187.
381. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
382. This proposal parallels the proposal in supra note 187 to make the United States
liable for torture by those acting on its behalf under the same circumstances as a local
government would be under § 1983. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); see also Wheeldin v.
Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963) ("Over the years Congress has considered the problem of
state civil and criminal actions against federal officials many times. But no general statute
making federal officers liable for acts committed 'under color,' but in violation, of their
federal authority has been passed." (citation omitted)).
383. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-8 (1980).
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same token, it is arguably more reasonable to require federal officials to
understand statutory and regulatory provisions governing the treatment of
detainees than to understand the presently murky constitutional terrain.
Furthermore, civil liability for violations of statutes and regulations
proscribing torture could facilitate compliance with those statutes and
regulations. Unfortunately, § 1983's promise as a remedy for violations of
federal statutory and regulatory rights has not been fully realized because of
interpretative complexity and restrictive Supreme Court precedent.384 At a
minimum, however, the same remedial promise should be extended to the
victims of U.S.-sanctioned torture as now extends to the victims of
mistreatment by state and local officials.385 In my view, this is true because,
as a matter of fairness, the federal government and its officials should not
benefit from a double standard.
As an alternative to holding federal officials liable under the same
circumstances as state and local officials would be under § 1983, Congress
could amend existing legislation, the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991
("TVPA"). 386 Currently, the TVPA creates a cause of action for the victims
of torture inflicted under color of foreign law.387 Congress could amend the
TVPA to extend the cause of action to the victims of torture inflicted under
color of federal law. Similar to the first alternative (which would use § 1983
as a model for the liability of federal officials), amending the TVPA to
384. See generally FALLON ET AL., supra note 14, at 1092-97. Federal officials would
have the same immunity from § 1983 claims that they now have from Bivens claims. Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 500-01 (1978) (stating that, "in the absence of congressional
direction to the contrary," federal officials should have no greater immunity from liability for
constitutional torts than state officials have).
385. The availability of a remedy for torture that violates federal statutory and
regulatory rights would not only benefit the victims of the torture. It also could obviate
constitutional tort claims for torture and the attendant risk that judicial analysis of such claims
will distort constitutional law. Torture cases may be the paradigmatic "hard cases" that make
bad constitutional law. Like death penalty cases, torture cases often involve horrific facts that
can skew analysis. Unlike death penalty cases, however, torture cases can be hard to identify,
because it is hard to define torture, and so torture case law will be harder to wall off than death
penalty jurisprudence. Consequently, torture cases, even more than death penalty cases, may
distort constitutional law in other settings. Cf Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 368 (1972)
(Douglas, J., in support of the judgment) ("[T]here is one conclusion about the penalty that is
universally accepted-i.e., it tends to distort the course of the criminal law." (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
386. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note
(2000)).
387. Id. § 2(a), 106 Stat. at 73; see supra note 273.
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extend it to U.S-sanctioned torture is justified on grounds of comparable
treatment. The first alternative treats federal officials comparably to state and
local officials; the second treats them comparably to foreign officials.3 88 The
principle of comparable treatment not only justifies these alternatives, but
also may make them politically feasible, though far from perfect.
V. CONCLUSION
Current law treats U.S.-sanctioned torture as a tort. Thus, the victims of
U.S.-sanctioned torture can sue the United States for money damages under
the Federal Tort Claims Act and can sue U.S. officials for money damages
under the "constitutional tort" doctrine of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics Agency. Each route has two main
problems. First, neither leads much of anywhere. The United States will
avoid liability for most torture claims because of limits that the FTCA places
on U.S. liability, and most officials will avoid liability for torture claims
because of limits on the Bivens remedy. Second, the FTCA and Bivens
doctrine are not only inadequate because they seldom yield any remedy for
torture, but also because they misconceive torture as simply another tort. Put
another way, neither the FICA nor Bivens was designed for claims of U.S.-
sanctioned torture. A better, though far from perfect, system would make the
United States liable for money from torture under the same circumstances as
units of local government are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and would make
U.S. officials liable in money damages from torture under the same
circumstances as either (1) state and local officials are liable under § 1983 or
388. The text's reference to "foreign officials" means individuals who act "under
actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation." Id. § 2(a), 106 Stat. at 73.
A report on extraordinary rendition states that U.S. officials involved in extraordinary
rendition might be held liable under the TVPA on the theory that they acted "under color of
foreign law." Torture by Proxy, supra note 12, at 121 (referring to the TVPA as the "TPA"). It
is doubtful that a U.S. official acting under color of federal law can, at the same time, be
acting under color of foreign law, unless perhaps the official was a double agent. See Arar v.
Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 264-66 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (dismissing a TVPA claim against
U.S. officials involved in extraditing plaintiff to Syria for torture, and holding that those
officials did not act under color of foreign law, as required for TVPA liability); Schneider v.
Kissinger, 310 F. Supp. 2d 251, 267 (D.D.C. 2001) (holding that former National Security
Advisor Henry Kissinger was not acting under color of foreign law for purposes of the TVPA
when he planned a coup in Chile with the assistance of certain Chilean officials), affid on
other grounds, 412 F.3d 190, 194-98 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that claims were barred by the
political question doctrine).
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(2) foreign officials are liable under the Torture Victim Protection Act of
1991.
